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DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA:
ECONOMIC CRISES AND THE RESTRUCTURING
OF FINANCIAL PROPERTY
Horacio Spector*
I. INTRODUCTION
Property rights are a prerequisite for economic growth. Indeed,
economists and legal scholars stress the ability of property rights to
solve collective action problems, such as the tragedy of the commons
and the tragedy of the anti-commons. 1 More direct contributions have
also been noted. For instance, it has been argued that formal land ownership plays a central role in economic development, and that formal
property titles are correlated with an increase in social well-being. 2

* Dean of the Law School and Professor of courses in Law and Economics and Legal
Theory at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. The author is grateful to Eduardo Levy
Yeyati, who read the whole Article and made helpful comments. The author also
benefited from conversations with Pablo Guerchunoff, Pablo Guidotti, and Ilya Somin,
and also thanks Camila Romero and the staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law for their painstaking checking of all the citations herein.
1. This literature really started in the Scottish Enlightenment. See DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § II (Dolphin Books ed. 1961) (1740).
Among contemporary works, see, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989), Stephen R. Munzer, The Commons and the Anticommons in
the Law and Theory of Property, in 10 THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson ed., 2005), David
Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY
MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS (D. Schmidtz & E. Willott eds., 2002), Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967), Robert
C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, (1993), Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998), and Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
2. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
For an excellent “natural
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When assessing the economic functions of property, it is generally
assumed that financial property rights are as beneficial for economic
growth as are property rights over tangible assets. 3 The public policy
recipe in this situation would be to respect property claims over financial
assets to the greatest possible extent. However, perfect compliance with
financial property raises special problems. While natural catastrophes
(such as floods, earthquakes, or tsunamis) can damage land holdings and
real estate, the working of a market economy by itself cannot annul or
reshape real property. By contrast, financial property is subject to the
vagaries of economic and political markets. In fact, the respect for financial property can become impossible in the event of a microeconomic (insolvency, bankruptcy, etc.) or macroeconomic crisis (bank run,
stock market crash, financial fallout, etc.).
This Article will discuss five paradigms that can be used in order to
restructure financial property under economic crises, particularly those
affecting emerging market economies: the emergency paradigm, the
monetary paradigm, the valorist paradigm, the social justice paradigm,
and the bankruptcy paradigm. Both the emergency and monetary
paradigms have been heavily influenced by decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. 4 The valorist paradigm is of German origin, 5 and the
social justice paradigm can be regarded as an application of the doctrine
that private property has a social function, espoused by socialist and
Catholic social thought. 6 The last paradigm, the bankruptcy paradigm,
is a theoretical construct that has never been used.

experiment” study that shows that land titling develops individualist and materialist
beliefs, see Rafael Di Tella et al., The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the
Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters, 122 Q. J. ECON. 209 (2007).
3. See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244 (acknowledging flaws in theories that presuppose that individuals, when allowed to make their own decisions based on their
property rights without government interference, will reach decisions that are optimal
for society).
4. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN, CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987).
5. BERND RÜTHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG. ZUM WANDEL DER
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS (1997).
6. Leon Duguit, Les Transformations Générales Du Droit Privé Depuis de Code
Napoléon, in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 12936 (Alejandro Alvarez ed., 1969). For the Catholic Church’s doctrine about the social
function of private property, see the following encyclicals: Pius XI, Quadragesimo
Anno (1931), John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (1961), Paul VI, Populorum Progressio
(1967), and John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991).
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The Article will expose the inadequacies of the first four paradigms,
both in light of doctrinal analysis and political economy. Finally, it will
argue that the bankruptcy paradigm coheres with rule of law principles
and minimizes costs in terms of long-term economic growth. More
specifically, it will claim that the bankruptcy paradigm can maintain a
separation of powers, reduce rent-seeking by small interest groups, and
mitigate the overall damage to the financial system caused by a crisis.
This paradigm is especially helpful to respond to bank runs in countries
that have a currency board or formal dollarization.
Two methodological features are worth emphasizing. First, the
kind of financial crisis on which the Article will focus takes place in
countries where financial liabilities are mostly denominated by foreign
currencies. The crisis starts with a bank run provoked by a drastic withdrawal of foreign and domestic capital, among other relevant factors.
The bank run creates severe illiquidity in the banking system which, if
not rapidly treated, will cause overall insolvency. Furthermore, there is
no lender of last resort or other possible safeguards that could contain
the fallout. Insurance deposit schemes or international financial assistance are either unavailable or insufficient. Though the analysis here
will focus on this kind of crisis, many of its conclusions are also relevant
for financial crises under other currency regimes.
Second, the Article will discuss decisions by the Argentine
Supreme Court in 1986, 1990, and 2002 through 2006, and by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1920s and 1930s. In Argentina, litigation as a
result of the mega-crisis of 2001 was massive. 7 By April 2002, the
Attorney General confirmed that 210,188 injunctions [amparos] were
filed in federal courts against the suspension of cash payments
[corralito] and the freezing and pesification of deposits [corralón]. 8 In
addition, provincial courts throughout the country ordered injunctions in

7. Catalina Smulovitz, Judicialization of Protest in Argentina, The Case of
Corralito, in ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NEW
LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 55 (Enrique Peruzzotti & Catalina Smulovitz eds.,
2006). Post-crisis litigation in Argentina was however of a much smaller scale than
litigation in Germany after the hyperinflation of 1918-1923, which soared to several
millions of cases. For an account of German litigation, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM,
MONEY IN THE LAW–NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE
BORDERLINE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 206-11 (1950).
8. Pesification is the compulsory conversion of U.S. dollar-denominated bank
deposits into Argentine pesos at an official exchange rate.
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audita parte 9 that compelled banks to return deposited sums in U.S.
dollars to plaintiffs, without adjudicating the substantive question of
law. 10 Some provincial courts were accused of unethical behavior. 11
Bank depositors also organized a widespread social and political mobilization that included banging pots and pans, assaults on banks, and popular assemblies.
While Argentina provides a fascinating case study, the problem
addressed in this Article has arisen in other emerging market economies,
as well. Similar situations have arisen in Mexico (1994-1995), Korea
and Indonesia (1997), Russia (1998), Ecuador (1998-2000), and
Uruguay (2002), resulting in financial debacles that led to bank runs,
defaults, massive devaluations, and political instability. 12 Though a
bank run is difficult to conceive today in developed countries that have
easy access to domestic and international capital markets, bank runs
may, in principle, occur in even the most developed economies. Recall
the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s, which led the Ohio state
government in March 1985 to declare a bank holiday to prevent a run on
Home State Savings Bank. 13 To this extent, the conclusions reached in
this Article might also provide a point of reference for discussing
responses to financial crises in the developed world.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Article will discuss the paradigms involving the reshaping of
property rights against the background of the United States and
Argentine Constitutions. Both Constitutions contain similar relevant
clauses. First, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution provides that no persons shall be “deprived of . . . life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 14 The Fifth Amend9.
10.

These injunctions were ordered without hearing the banks’ defenses.
Héctor Mairal, Argentina: El derecho en tiempos de cólera, 3 ACTUALIDAD
JURÍDICA 3, 20 (2002).
11. Horacio M. Lynch, Emergencia, Derecho, Justicia y Seguridad Jurídica
(Reflexiones Sobre la Crisis y las Libertades Económicas), REVISTA JURÍDICA ARG. –
LA LEY [L.L.] (2002).
12. JEROME SGARD, L’ECONOMIE DE LA PANIQUE: FAIRE FACE AUX CRISES
FINANCIERES (2002).
13. This Article was finished in March 2008, well before the financial meltdown in
the U.S. and in Europe. For a useful report on the crisis in the thrift industry and its
macro-economic origins, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ment also adds, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” 15 Similarly, the Argentine Constitution,
enacted in 1853 and put into full force in 1860, establishes in Article 17,
“Property is inviolable and no inhabitant of the Nation shall be deprived
of it but in virtue of a court judgment founded on law. Expropriation
because of public utility must be so qualified by a law and previously
indemnified.” 16 The protection of private property in the Argentine
Constitution is thus as robust as that afforded by the U.S. Constitution.
Moreover, Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution guarantees inhabitants the right to “use and dispose of property.”17
In both U.S. and Argentine constitutional law, private property
encompasses creditor rights arising out of contracts, such as bank deposits. Indeed, this is the case in the U.S. Constitution as a result of the
Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10. 18 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that reliance interests are included in property. 19 The
Argentine Constitution is much the same. The Argentine Supreme
Court has declared that the term “property” covers “all interests a man
can possess, outside himself, his life, and liberty, as well as all rights
that have a recognized value, either emerging from private law relations
or administrative acts.” 20 More specifically, the Court has stated “it is
also true that the rights awarded by a contract to the creditor constitute
his property, as all the goods that form his patrimony, all of which are
protected by the constitutional guarantee of Article 17.” 21
The current Argentine Constitution also lays down social and economic rights that could conflict with property rights. Thus, Article 14
bis 22 , added in 1957, as well as various human rights provisions introduced by the constitutional reform of 1994 through the incorporation of
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
CONST. ARG. art. 17.
Id. art. 14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
20. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 14/12/1925, “Bourdieu, Pedro
E. v. Municipalidad de la Capital Federal,” Fallos (1925-145-307) (Arg.).
21. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar
Agustín v. de la Pesa, don Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-17221) ¶5 (Arg.).
22. In Argentine legislative practice, the suffix “bis” serves to denominate a new
article or clause when the lawmaker wants to avoid re-numbering all the subsequent
articles or clauses.
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international treaties, establish certain rights such as the right to decent
housing and the right to basic welfare. 23 Such rights could arguably
justify the curtailment of private property. 24 For instance, the American
Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the right to the
use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use
and enjoyment to the interest of society.” 25 Though such provisions are
absent in the U.S. Constitution, Scholar Frank Michelman has tried to
infer social and economic rights from the Equal Protection Clause. 26
The U.S. and the Argentine constitutions establish two other kinds
of powers that are relevant for this inquiry. First, both the U.S. and the
Argentine Constitutions afford Congress power over monetary policy.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress is
empowered “[t]o coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin.” 27 Article 75, paragraph 11, of the Argentine Constitution
contains an identical provision. 28 Second, in U.S. and Argentine
constitutional law private property is consistent with bankruptcy law, as
evidenced by Article I, Section 8’s declaration thatCongress shall have
the power to establish “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States.” 29 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has
construed the Contracts Clause as consistent with state power to pass
bankruptcy legislation that modifies remedies for breach of contract. 30
The Argentine Constitution has a similar bankruptcy provision in Article
75, paragraph 12. 31

23. CONST. ARG, art. 14 bis., art. 75, ¶ 22 (articles incorporate various international
treatises on Human Rights, such as the American Convention of Human Rights).
24. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 15/3/2007, “Rinaldi, Francisco
Augusto y otro c/ Guzman Toledo, Ronal Constante y otra s/ ejecución hipotecaria,”
Fallos (2007-330-855) (Arg.).
25. AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 21, ¶ 1, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(emphasis added).
26. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawl’s Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1005 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1969).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I.
28. CONST. ARG. art. 75.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I.
30. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122
(1819).
31. CONST. ARG. art. 75.
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III. THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1929) AND THE ARGENTINE CRISIS (2001)
The United States suffered bank runs in 1893, 1907, and during the
Great Depression period. In 1893 and 1907, the situation was handled
through a privately concerted restriction of convertibility of deposits into
currency. 32 In the 1930s, however, the Federal Reserve System operated
in a different way.
The Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933 granted President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt emergency powers over banking transactions, foreign exchange dealings, gold and currency movements. 33 The
next day, on March 10, the President issued a decree prohibiting gold
payments unless permitted by the Secretary of the Treasury. 34 On April
5, a subsequent decree forbade the hoarding of gold and required all
holders of gold to deliver their gold coins, bullion, or certificates to
Federal Reserve Banks on or before May 1 (excluding rare coins,
reasonable amounts for use in industry and the arts, and a maximum of
$100 per person in gold coins and gold certificates). 35 On January 30,
1934, Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act, under which the President
established a fixed buying and selling price of $35 per ounce for gold,
thereby devaluing the gold dollar to 59.06 percent. 36 According to the
Gold Reserve Act, title to all gold coins and bullion was vested in the
United States; all gold coins were withdrawn from circulation and
melted into bullion; further gold coinage was to be discontinued; and the
Secretary of the Treasury was to control all dealings in gold. 37
The model of crisis resolution established by the U.S. Federal
Government during the Great Depression became very influential in
Argentina. The Argentine debacle in 2001 unfolded much like the Great
Depression had, resulting in catastrophic effects on the country’s economy. 38 On November 30, fears of devaluation and deposit freeze
32.

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
108-11, 156-63 (1963).
33. Id. at 421.
34. Id. at 422.
35. Id. at 462-63.
36. Id. at 469.
37. Id. at 469-70.
38. In fact, GDP fell 28%, and unemployment rose from 18.3% in 2001 to 23.6%
in 2002. Poverty rate rose from 25.9% in 1998 to 38.3% in 2001 and 57.5% in 2002.
JIM SAXTON, VICE CHAIRMAN JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONG., ARGENTINA’S
ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES 1 (June 2003), available at http://www.house.
gov/jec/imf/06-13-03long.pdf.
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960
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pushed interest rates in pesos to an average of 689% overnight, and the
bank run accelerated at high speed. 39 On December 1, 2001, the
Argentine government announced a freeze on bank deposits. Decree
1,570/2001, Article 2, prohibited cash withdrawals of more than two
hundred and fifty pesos ($250 pesos) or two hundred and fifty dollars
(US$250) per week, made by any holder or holders from the total balance of the bank accounts opened with each financial entity. 40 Minister
Cavallo and President De la Rua were forced to resign on December 19
in the midst of great social and political turmoil. Then, from December
20 through December 31, interim presidents Ramon Puerta, Adolfo
Rodriguez Saa, and Eduardo Camaño took office. Finally, on January 1,
2002, the two Houses of Congress appointed Eduardo Duhalde as
President and a series of measures were taken to address the disastrous
situation. First, Congress enacted the Public Emergency and Exchange
Regulations Reform Law 25,561 (called “the Emergency Law”), which
ended the “convertibility” monetary system that had been in effect since
1991. 41 This law also applied the exchange rate of one peso per US$1
for a certain group of debts with financial entities, not exceeding the
sum of US$100,000, including mortgage and individual loans. 42
Second, by Decree 71/2002, President Duhalde devalued the Argentine
Peso to $1.40 per dollar for certain transactions, and established a
managed floating rate system for all other operations and transactions. 43
Later, on February 4, the President issued Decree 214/2002, pursuant to
which all bank deposits were “pesified” at $1.40 pesos per US$1 and
revalued at various time periods. 44 This order also provided for the
application of an index of inflationary correction (“CER”) to all
rescheduled bank deposits. 45 Because Decree 214/2002 “pesified” loans
with the financial system at $1.00 peso per US$1 – a measure that
greatly benefited local and foreign corporations – the overall system was
known as “asymmetric pesification.” 46 The free exchange rate, on the
other hand, which at the time was approximately $2.80 pesos per US$1,

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 9.
Decree No. 1.570/2001 art. 2, Dec. 3, 2001, B.O. 29787 (Arg.).
Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.).
Id. art. 6.
Decree No. 71/2002 art. 1, Jan. 9, 2002, B.O. 29813 (Arg.).
Decree No. 214/2002 art. 2, Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830 (Arg.).
Id. art. 4.
Gabriel Gómez-Giglio, Emergency Law and Financial Entities in Argentina, 10
J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 397, 401 (2003).
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doubled the “pesification” rate for depositors; the difference was even
larger for debtors.
Successive decrees and lower norms made it possible for depositors
to obtain government bonds for the difference between the official and
the free exchange rate. On May 31, Decree 905/2002 granted depositors
the option to swap all rescheduled deposits for government bonds in
U.S. dollars (“Bodens”); depositors who did not opt for the swap were
given certificates of rescheduled deposits (“Cedros”). 47 Finally, Decree
1836/2002 granted depositors various options to swap all or part of their
Cedros for government bonds. 48 The obvious goal of both decrees was
to put 2001 depositors at a position no worse than those under the Bonex
Plan, which is discussed further in Part IV of this Article.
IV. THE EMERGENCY PARADIGM
During the 1920s and 1930s, American constitutional jurisprudence
analogized an economic and social emergency to war, thus justifying an
encroachment of private property and freedom of contract as an exercise
of Congress’s extraordinary powers during times of emergency. 49
It is common to regard emergency regulations – such as restriction
or deferral of the convertibility of deposits into currency, as well as the
compulsory currency conversion of bank deposits, bonds, and other
creditor rights – as infringements of property rights and freedom of
contract that are grounded on public interest reasons. 50 Indeed,
resolving an emergency situation seems to be the paradigm of serving
the public interest. The emergency paradigm allows individual rights to
be sacrificed when necessary to avert a social or economic catastrophe.
Emergency norms thus contradict ordinary norms. However, this does
impede the coherent functioning of the legal system: emergency norms
simply suspend, during a period of time, the application of ordinary

47.
48.

Decree No. 905/2002, June 1, 2002, B.O. 29911 (Arg.).
Decree No. 1836/2002, Sept. 16, 2002, B.O. 2995 (Arg.). A detailed account
of all normative changes can be found in Gómez-Giglio, supra note 46, at 403, and
Gabriel Gómez-Giglio, Argentina and the Changing Nature of Financial Regulation, 9
J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 317 (2004).
49. Higgs, supra note 4, at 159-72.
50. Id.
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norms. During the state of emergency, ordinary norms are not rendered
null, but rather their application is suspended. 51
From a philosophical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that
even natural rights theories do not necessarily dismiss the possibility
that, under catastrophic conditions, it might be morally permissible to
infringe on individual rights. 52 Thus, Argentine Judge and law professsor, Martín Farrell, contends that utilitarian considerations outweigh
rights-based decision making when respecting individual rights will lead
to tragic consequences. 53 While a judge’s moral obligation is to enforce
rights, under conditions of political unrest or social emergency, a judge
can allow the infringement of individual rights if necessary to prevent
tragic consequences. 54
When emergency measures are analyzed in terms of the property/
public interest matrix, two different normative stances are possible.
Under a conservative-libertarian, Lochner-type approach, any infringement on private property that does not seek to prevent nuisance constitutes compensable government taking. 55 Alternatively, aligning with
New Deal policy, Congressional legislation can legitimately curb private
property rights in extenuating situations by simply alleging a public
interest goal. 56 Compensation is then only applicable in cases of physi-

51. Ricardo Guarinoni, La emergencia y los jueces, in DERECHO, LENGUAJE Y
LÓGICA 91 (2006).
52. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29-30 (Basic Books, Inc.
1974). In one of the most important natural rights treatises of the twentieth century,
Robert Nozick says: “The question of whether these side constraints [individual rights]
are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral
horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is one I hope largely to avoid.” Id. at 30.
53. Martín Diego Farell, Los planes económicos y la Corte Suprema, in FILOSOFÍA
DEL DERECHO Y ECONOMÍA 15-16 (2006).
54. Id. at 17.
55. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35-41 (1985).
56. The so-called Constitutional “Revolution” of 1937, which abolished substantive due process, was completed in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
147 (1938). Justification of encroachments on private property is often given in terms
of fairness or mutual advantage. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation” Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 160 (1971).
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cal invasion or significant reduction of economic value. 57 Argentina
followed the latter approach.
The Argentine Supreme Court was ready to catch up with U.S.
emergency doctrines as appropriate interpretations of the Argentine
Constitution. 58 The doctrine of Economic Emergency harks back to
Ercolano v. Lanteri. 59 However, in Horta v.Harguindeguy 60 the Court
declared that rights vested by fixed term contracts made before the
emergency law could not be encroached on; in Mango v. Traba, 61 the
Court stressed that violations of the rights to use and dispose of property
must not exceed the emergency period. 62 Then, in the landmark
decision of Avico v. de la Pesa, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a law passed in 1933 that established a three-year moratorium on
mortgage payments and foreclosures and capped the interest rate at six
percent. 63 This decision was influenced by the U.S. doctrines in Nebbia
v. New York 64 and Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 65
In Blaisdell, a Minnesota act imposed a limited moratorium on the foreclosure of mortgages. James W. Ely described the position of Chief
Justice Hughes, who spoke for the Court:

57. See, e.g., Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1923, 1933 (1997).
58. For helpful works, see Alberto Garay, Federalism, The Judiciary, and
Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional
Model, 22 INTER-AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1991), William C. Banks & Alejandro D.
Carrió, Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United
States, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 63. (1993), and Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and
Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina,
21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 141 (1997).
59. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/4/1922, “Ercolano v.
Lanteri,” Fallos (1922-136-161) (Arg.).
60. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 21/8/1922, “Horta v.
Harguindeguy,” Fallos (1922-137-60) (Arg.).
61. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 26/8/1925, “Mango v. Traba,”
Fallos (1925-144-219) (Arg.).
62. Id.
63. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar
Agustín v. de la Pesa, don Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-17221) ¶5 (Arg.).
64. 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
65. 290 U.S. 398, 415 (1934).
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Clearly influenced by the economic emergency, Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes ruled that contracts were subject to the
reasonable exercise of the state police power. The police power
encompassed the authority to give temporary relief for extraordinary
economic distress. Although susceptible to a narrow construction
limiting valid impairments of contracts to emergency situations,
Hughes’s opinion also suggested in broad terms that the state’s
interest in regulating economic affairs could justify interference with
66
contracts.

In Avico, by summarizing the requirements imposed in Blaisdell
Attorney General Horacio L. Larreta submitted to the U.S. Supreme
Court a four-prong test to determine the constitutionality of a moratorium. Specifically, (1) the conditions existing must have created an
emergency situation; (2) the fundamental purpose of the measure, and of
government acts in general, is to safeguard the public and promote general welfare to the people; (3) the postponement of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be reasonable; and (4) the change in legislation must have
been provided in a temporary manner. 67
Following Blaisdell, Larreta maintained that “a moratorium does
not attack property, which is maintained with all its attributes, and only
delays the application of the remedies that are available to the creditor.” 68 The Court stressed the difference between the substance of property and the remedies for its protection by quoting the opinion delivered
by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crownishield. Marshall pointed
to the distinction between an obligation and the remedy to enforce it: 69
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy
given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at
the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as
70
the wisdom of the nation shall direct.

Thus, the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and Argentine
Supreme Court in Blaisdell and Avico, respectively, maintained that for
emergency reasons, the federal government is allowed to modify the

66. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (1998).
67. Avico, Fallos (1934-172-21) at 34-35.
68. Id. at 33.
69. 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
70. Id. at 200.
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“time dimension” of property rights, provided this modification is
reasonable. 71
The Argentine Supreme Court’s borrowing of the emergency paradigm in Avico would prove useful many decades later in sustaining the
constitutionality of emergency decrees in Argentine financial crises.
The most important decision in this area came in the context of the economic crisis of 1989, in the early days of President Menem’s administration. The President issued Decree 36/90, which converted time
deposits into public bonds (“Bonex 1989”). 72 The publicized goal of
this measure was to reduce the burden of the increasing internal public
debt. 73 In the famous decision of Peralta v. Nación Argentina 74 the
Argentine Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional validity of
Decree 36/90 by invoking the doctrine used by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Blaisdell, already transplanted into Argentine law in Avico. The
Court defined “emergency” in Peralta as “an extraordinary situation that
hovers over the economic-social order, with its burden of accumulated
troubles, in the form of scarcity, poverty, penury or indigence, and
creates a state of necessity which must be put to an end.”75
Importantly, Peralta stretched the emergency paradigm beyond that
which had been set forth in Blaisdell and Avico. In essence, the Court in
Peralta discussed two different issues: (1) whether the President possesses emergency powers of a legislative nature, and (2) whether the relevant authority (Congressional or Executive) can, in a state of emergency,
defer the paying out of deposits by restructuring them into public bonds.
Thus, Peralta introduces two possible sides to the doctrine of economic
emergency: functional emergency and regulatory emergency.
A functional emergency occurs when the state of emergency can
justify an alteration of the separation of powers established by the
Constitution, so that the President can exercise, with or without
Congress’s prior approval, powers ordinarily reserved to Congress. A
regulatory emergency, on the other hand, refers to the government’s

71. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY, ITS MEANING AND POWER
28 (2003) (a four-dimensional analysis of property in which time is the fourth
dimension).
72. Decree No. 36/90, Jan. 5, 1990, B.O. 26795 (Arg.).
73. PABLO GERCHUNOFF & LUCAS LLACH, EL CICLO DE LA ILUSIÓN Y EL
DESENCANTO 430 (2003)
74. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/1990, “Peralta, Luis
Arcenio v. Nación Argentina / acción de amparo,” Fallos (1990-313-513) (Arg.).
75. Id. at 571.
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wider powers of regulatory interference with constitutional rights that
are grounded on the need to protect fundamental public goals (e.g. the
preservation of the whole constitutional order).
In its assessment of regulatory emergencies, the Peralta Court
apparently rested on the doctrines used in Blaisdell and Avico:
In our law as well as in that of the United States of America, the laws
dictated in emergency situations have not been taken to be outside
the Federal Constitution in disregard of the right to property, when
they either limited themselves to not suspending indefinitely the
exercise of the creditor’s rights, or did not make difficult the fulfill76
ment of the obligations with excessively long terms.

However, Peralta equated a congressional moratorium (the measure challenged in Blaisdell and Avico) to a financial restructuring
scheme introduced by Presidential decree, thus stretching the borrowed
precedent from a regulatory emergency to a functional emergency.
Moreover, Peralta lengthened a short-term moratorium in Blaisdell (just
over two years) and Avico (three years) to a ten-year banking restructuring (the “Bonex Plan”). Therefore, by stretching the borrowed precedent in all these ways, the Court concluded that the President has an
emergency power to postpone the lawful exercise of property rights for
ten years. Further, in allowing such a postponement the Court did not
require compensation. 77
Subsequently, in December 2001, when President de la Rua suspended the convertibility of both demand and time deposits into cash by
Decree 1,570/2001, 78 it may have seemed that the Court would follow
Peralta in testing the constitutional validity of the decree. In fact, the
Court rejected exceptional cautionary measures [amparos] in the socalled Kiper case because they violated procedural due process. 79 A few
weeks later, however, the Court ruled in Smith that restrictions on bank
withdrawals and the emergency measures described in Section III

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Decree No. 1.570/2002 art. 2, Dec. 3, 2001, B.O. 29787 (Arg.).
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/12/01, “Banco de la Ciudad
de Buenos Aires s/ solicita se declare estado de emergencia economica,” Fallos (2001324-4520) (Arg.).

2009

DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA

785

amounted to confiscation of property. 80 Smith was a curious return to
Lochner-style jurisprudence. The Court declared:
The right to freely dispose of the funds invested or deposited with
banking and financial institutions is based on constitutional
principles, regardless of any other legal standards acknowledging it.
It is clear that any condition or restriction on such right will affect
the intangibility of property and impair the goal of promoting justice.
Such clashes with constitutional principles, given their seriousness
and the absence of crucial reasons for them, cannot be understood as
the result of reasonable regulations based on such principles, nor do
they arise from Article 28 of the Constitution (Decisions 305:945,
par. 8, last paragraph). This is clearly the case of the situation at
stake in the case sub lite, in which successive regulations went too
far, imposing conditions and restrictions on the free disposal of
private property that flagrantly violated the said constitutional
81
principles.

The Court made an unconvincing attempt to distinguish the facts in
Smith from those in Peralta by resorting to the doctrine of “vested
rights”:
In the light of the case law criteria mentioned above [vested rights
cases], the plaintiff’s property has been violated, given that the
deposits had been made while a system guaranteeing their
inviolability was in force. Furthermore, such guarantee had been
recently strengthened by Law 25466, which had declared deposits
intangible, with intangibility being defined as the impossibility by
the State to alter the conditions agreed upon by deposit holders and
the financial institution, as well as the prohibition to swap deposits
for State bonds, postpone payments, or restructure their maturity
(Sect. 1 to 4); these circumstances did, in fact, exceed those
82
described in the Peralta case recorded in Fallos 313:1513.

Thus, one could argue that the Court considered the suspension of
deposits’ intangibility by Emergency Law 25561, 83 passed in January
2002, as a new circumstance that was absent when it decided the Kiper

80. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 1/2/2002, “Smith, Carlos
Antonio v. P.E.N. / medidas cautelares,” Fallos (2002-325-28) (Arg.).
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id.
83. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.).
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case. There is little doubt, however, that Menem’s appointees in the
Court were mainly guided by political considerations. 84
In Smith, the Argentine Supreme Court justices (usually called the
“automatic majority” because they generally voted en bloc in favor of
President Menem’s policies) made an apparent preemptive strike to
deter Duhalde’s impeachment plans. Therefore, one could argue Smith
must be given an externalist explanation, that is, an explanation that is
not premised on judicial or doctrinal reasoning, but rather on political
grounds. 85 Apart from the political background of the decision – which
was widely documented in Argentine newspapers – two reasons support
this claim. First, it is difficult to explain why the Court decided to
adjudicate the substantive question of law in Smith, whereas it had
declined to do so in Kiper. The Court’s explanation was simply not
persuasive: “[T]he injunction requested and granted matches the object
of the appeal.” 86 In fact, the plaintiffs in both Kiper and Smith claimed
the same cautionary injunctions through amparos. Second, as Horacio
M. Lynch observes, it was ironic that after decades of validating the
most diverse invasions of private property and contractual freedom, such
as minimum prices, rent control legislation, and freezing of deposits, the
Argentine Supreme Court would suddenly return to a Lochner-type
conception of private property and freedom of contract. 87
In Provincia de San Luis 88 , the last case on pesification decided by
the so-called “automatic majority,” the Supreme Court restated the fundamental doctrines set forth in Smith. The Court held that pesification
of bank deposits went beyond the emergency powers because it altered
the substance of the depositors’ property rights, instead of simply putting off the remedies available to depositors. 89 Justices Eduardo Moliné
84.
85.

Lynch, supra note 11, at 1298.
See Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive
Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SC. REV. 291
(2002) (an externalist explanation of doctrinal shifts in the Argentine Supreme Court).
See generally Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal,
110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005) (features a description of the internalist/externalist
divide, and an internalist explanation of Supreme Court decisions during the New Deal
that separates them from President Roosevelt’s “Court-packing” plan).
86. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 1/2/2002, “Smith, Carlos
Antonio v. P.E.N. / medidas cautelares,” Fallos (2002-325-28) (Arg.).
87. Lynch, supra note 11, at 1287.
88. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) (Arg.).
89. Id. at 29.
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O’Connor and Guillermo A. F. López strongly emphasized Intangibility
Law No. 25.466 90 because, they declared, this law strengthened the
constitutional protection of depositors’ vested rights. The justices found
that “the energetic wording of those norms uncontroversially reveals the
existence of an economic policy addressed to capture deposits, creating
for such purpose a high degree of trust, which public power defrauded
almost immediately with the passing of those norms here questioned.” 91
The Court ordered Banco de la Nación Argentina (“the Nation”) to pay
off the dollar deposits to Provincia de San Luis (the “Province”); it also
instructed the Nation and the Province to agree on the method and dates
of repayment within sixty days, without modifying the substance of the
decision, under a penalty of the Court deciding the issues itself. 92
In 2004, a divided Court in Bustos overruled Smith and Provincia
de San Luis and sustained the constitutionality of pesification. 93 In
Bustos, the majority of the Court went back to the doctrines in Avico and
Blaisdell, that is, to the emergency paradigm. According to Bustos,
Congress or the President may establish pesification in a state of
emergency. 94
Justices Augusto Belluscio and Juan Carlos Maqueda offered a
critical assessment of the economic policies adopted in the 1990s:
[I]t is evident that the prolonged maintenance of an artificial value
equivalence between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar, together
with economic circumstances that the mentioned absence of
evidence impedes to clarify, led to a process of worsening of the
national productive apparatus – with its aftermath of
unemployment, misery and hunger – to which the unusual
interest rates offered for dollar deposits were relevant, to a threat of
bank run that the Government tried to avert by means of these rates,
and finally to a certain risk that that threat really should occur or
start, which were the determinants of the measures adopted by the
Executive Branch and the Congress with the goal of impeding the

90.
91.
92.
93.

Law No. 25.466, Sept. 25, 2001, B.O. 29739 (Arg.).
Provincia de San Luis, J.A. (2003-I-188) at 30.
Id. at 38.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) (Arg.) (concurring opinion of Judges
Augusto C. Belluscio and Juan C. Maqueda, Antonio Boggiano, Eugenio R. Zaffaroni,
and Elena Highton de Nolasco).
94. Id. at 29.
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generalized insolvency of the banking system and the subsequent
95
ruin of all depositors.

Belluscio and Maqueda availed themselves once again of Larreta’s
four-condition test and ruled that the test was met. They even advanced
an explanation of Argentina’s fall: “It is undisputable . . . that devaluation of national currency was an unavoidable measure in the face of the
grave emergency resulting from the value disequilibrium vis-à-vis the
U.S. dollar and the beginning of an important bank run.” 96 Interestingly,
Belluscio and Maqueda focused on real exchange overvaluation as the
cause of the crisis, but did not mention fiscal sustainability and the stop
of capital inflows. The explanation of the Argentine crisis remains
controversial in economic literature, with real exchange overvaluation
being only one of the factors cited. 97
Today, the Court adheres to this emergency paradigm, though most
federal courts still follow the doctrines of Smith and Provincia de San
Luis. In the recent Massa decision, the Court again applied the emergency paradigm. 98 It ruled that applying the conversion formula established by Decree 214/2002 – in an extended version that also covers the
period of legal proceedings – plus an annual interest rate fixed at four
percent, does not cause economic damage when restitution is made at

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
See, e.g., Guillermo A. Calvo et al., Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate, and
Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s Lessons, in EMERGING CAPITAL MARKETS IN
TURMOIL: BAD LUCK OR BAD POLICY? (Guillermo Calvo ed., 2005); Sebastián
Etchemendy, Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial
Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001, in ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY, THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS (Steven Levitsky & María Victoria Murillo eds., 2005);
Ricardo Hausmann & Andres Velasco, Hard Money’s Soft Underbelly: Understanding
the Argentine Crisis, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 2002 61 (Susan M. Collins & Dani
Rodrik eds., 2003); Augusto de la Torre et al., Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The
Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board, ECONOMIA 8 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Economia-DelaTorre-LevyYeyatiSchmukler.pdf; Martin Feldstein, Argentina’s Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial
Crisis, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2002).
98. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/2006, “Massa, Juan A.
v. E.N.”, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-II-185) at 13 (Arg.) (concurring opinion
of Judges Elena Highton de Nolasco, E. Raúl Zaffaroni, Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti, and
Carmen Argibay).
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the time of the decision. 99 Justices Elena I. Highton de Nolasco, E. Raúl
Zaffaroni, and Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti held:
[A]n interpretation contrary to this fundamental regime of economic
working (the “emergency legislative bloc,” which includes the new
exchange system), if adopted years after the implementation of this
regime, would yield very grave institutional sequels, which is
contrary to the interpretative standard that requires to ponder over
100
the consequences that result from judicial decisions.

The Court declared in Peralta, Bustos, and Massa that it was
following the doctrine in Blaisdell, and its Argentine analogue in Avico.
In fact, however, the compulsory swap of deposits for public bonds in
1991 and the conversion of dollar deposits into rescheduled peso
deposits in 2002 nevertheless altered the substance of the obligations,
thus violating the right to property (even considering the option to swap
deposits for dollar denominated Government bonds). 101 As noted above,
Blaisdell and Avico made a crucial distinction between the substance of
an obligation (e.g., a creditor right) and the remedies available to obtain
its execution. The emergency paradigm permits deferral of the available
remedies when necessary to overcome the crisis, but it disallows even a
temporary alteration of the nature of the underlying obligations. A compulsory swap for government bonds modifies the essence of an obligation because, among other things, it substitutes the government for the
original obligor. The same principle applies to the conversion of bank
deposits into pesos at an official rate, because this conversion modifies
the economic value of the deposit. 102
V. THE MONETARY PARADIGM
During the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court did not return
to Blaisdell in order to review gold dollar contracts after the abandonment of the gold standard. Though the Court discussed the abrogation
of gold clauses under the rhetoric of emergency, its approach in these
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Marta Macías, Revisión del fallo Bustos según la doctrina de sus precedentes.
Análisis de la jurisprudencia citada en el voto de los Dres. Belluscio y Maqueda, S.J.A.
(2005).
102. Justice Carmen Argibay expressed this opinion in her concurring opinion in
Massa.
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cases forms a different paradigm, the monetary paradigm. President
Roosevelt forbade, with certain exceptions, the commerce of gold
throughout the entire nation; Congress redefined obligations fixed in
gold dollars into obligations in unconvertible dollars. 103 Chief Justice
Hughes, speaking for the majority, distinguished between private and
public contracts in five decisions usually known as the “Gold Clause
Cases,” yet reaffirmed in all these cases comprehensive congressional
power over monetary policy. As Robert Higgs explains: “By validating
the abandonment of the gold standard, [these decisions] released the
federal government from a powerful restraint on its expansion of the
money stock. Not by coincidence has the subsequent half-century been
an age of inflation.” 104
It is important to realize that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was
quite different in the three private-contract and the two public-contract
cases. 105 In U.S. v. Bankers’ Trust Co., 106 and Norman v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., 107 the Court addressed the validity of the Joint
Resolution of June 5, 1933 108 with respect to the “gold clauses” of private contracts for the payment of money:
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority
of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but, when
contracts deal with a subject-matter which lies within the control of
the congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot
remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional
109
power by making contracts about them.

Further, the majority opinion explained that it was neither a state of
emergency, nor the consequences arising thereof, that mattered in its
decision:
We are not concerned with consequences, in the sense that consequences, however serious, may excuse an invasion of constitutional
right. We are concerned with the constitutional power of the
Congress over the monetary system of the country and its attempted
frustration. . . . The contention that these gold clauses are valid

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

H.R.J. 192, 73d Cong. (1st Sess. 1933).
HIGGS, supra note 4, at 186.
See John P. Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 647 (1935).
294 U.S. 240 (1935).
293 U.S. 548 (1934).
H.R.J. 192.
294 U.S. at 307-08.
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contracts and cannot be struck down proceeds upon the assumption
that private parties, and states and municipalities, may make and
110
enforce contracts which may limit that authority.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of Government bonds in
Nortz v. United States 111 and Perry v. United States 112 , striking down the
Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933. This resolution had provided that
clauses requiring payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency were against public policy, and that every obligation, theretofore or
thereafter incurred, “shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar,
in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for
public or private debts.” 113 Government bonds fell under this resolution
because they provided that the principal and interest would be payable
“in United States gold coin of the present standard of value.” 114 The
Court declared in Perry that the Joint Resolution went beyond the
Congressional power because it attempted to override the obligation
created by the bond in suit. “The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign
power of the people to override their will as thus declared.” 115 Moreover, the Perry court held, “[t]he action is for breach of contract. As a
remedy for breach, plaintiff can recover no more than the loss he has
suffered and of which he may rightfully complain. He is not entitled to
be enriched.” 116
As to the issue of how to establish the baseline for assessing compensable damages, the Court said: “The question of actual loss cannot
fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the
time the government offered to pay him the $10,000, the face of his
bond, in legal tender currency. The case is not the same as if gold coin
had remained in circulation.” 117 The Court did not consider the mere
impossibility of converting the nominal amount of dollars into gold at
the previous exchange rate as a compensable damage. As Higgs says,

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 316.
294 U.S. 317 (1935).
294 U.S. 330 (1935).
H.R.J. 192.
Id.
Perry, 294 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
Id. at 355.
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[the court] reached this conclusion by assuming that during 19331934 the government could and did legitimately deny Americans
recourse to foreign markets for gold and foreign currency linked to
gold. In other words, the government’s (unconstitutional) abrogation
of its obligation to pay gold to bondholders has caused them no
determinate harm because access to the markets wherein the value of
the damages could have been established had been foreclosed by
118
other (constitutional) governmental restrictions.

Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, emphasized this
point by asserting:
Plaintiff demands the ‘equivalent’ in currency of the gold coin
promised. But ‘equivalent’ cannot mean more than the amount of
money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the
bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used. That
equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the
light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had
119
lawfully established.

A logical conclusion, therefore, is that the monetary paradigm is
relevant when denomination of liabilities in gold currency or foreign
exchange (e.g., U.S. dollar) is a central component in a banking crisis.
In fact, liability dollarization played a key role in the Argentine crisis,
because the devaluation and abandonment of the currency board caused
a severe balance-sheet mismatch in non-tradable sectors. 120 However,
the monetary paradigm does not really apply to the Argentine crisis.
The Argentine Supreme Court adopted divergent stances on this issue.
While Bustos generally adopted the emergency paradigm, Justices
Belluscio and Maqueda invoked the monetary paradigm in their opinion
by citing Perry. 121 Their argument merits careful scrutiny. The justices
argued that “the supposed property of dollars was nothing more than a
great fallacy.” 122 They asserted this bold claim as follows:

118.
119.
120.

HIGGS, supra note 4, at 187.
Perry, 294 U.S. at 357.
Calvo et al., supra note 97, at 144-45 (noting that liability dollarization was
also important in the crises of Korea and Indonesia (1997) and Turkey (2001)).
121. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2005-III-189) at 10 (Arg.).
122. Id. at 29.
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In Argentina no one earned in American dollars, hence it follows that
denominating bank deposits in that currency was either a way of
using it simply as an accounting unit – no one is unaware that to a
great extent pesos were deposited and that these were converted to
an equal amount of dollars, an equivalence whose falsity became notorious if the impossible task was attempted to convert pesos for dollars abroad (except in some neighboring countries), and whose fictitious nature is now very clearly seen – or of preparing the purchase
123
of dollars at a low and base price – that of exchange rate . . . .

Thus, Justices Belluscio and Maqueda assumed that a currency
board is a delusion because it maintains a convertible national currency
(in which salaries, for instance, are still being denominated). This is
meaningless: it is like saying that the currency board is delusional because it is a currency board.
The Argentine currency board lasted 10 years. It is debatable
whether it could have lasted longer under different fiscal conditions.
But the important issue is that sustainability of an exchange system is
quite different from its “ontological” status (as real or delusive). For
example, Hong Kong’s currency board has been operating since 1983
with the Hong Kong dollar pegged at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S.
dollar. Is this fictitious? A currency board is probably not the best exchange system for coping with the deflationary rigidities of modern
democratic and unionized politics, as the Great Depression and
Argentine crises have tragically shown. 124 Yet a currency board is no
less real than any other exchange system. On the contrary, if “artificial”
has any clear meaning in this context, it is evident that inconvertible
paper money is more artificial than convertible paper money. In the
Court’s opinion, financial contracts denominated in U.S. dollars are
always fictitious or fallacious under any exchange rate system except
dollarization. This is an unsupported claim. The justices also failed to
explain why bonds issued by a government in default (for which bank
deposits could be swapped) were less “artificial” than dollar deposits
under convertibility.
After criticizing the currency board, Justices Belluscio and
Maqueda held that depositors (at least those who do not prove that they
need U.S. dollars for operations abroad) cannot claim damages against
123.
124.

Id.
Cf. Barry Eichengreen & Peter Temin, The Gold Standard and the Great
Depression 15-16, 24-26, 37-38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6060, 1997).
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the State as a result of the compulsory pesification of bank contracts.
Borrowing an argument from Perry, Belluscio and Maqueda stated:
“pesification presents itself as reasonable as long as the amount to be returned has the same or greater purchasing power than the original deposit, because this does not cause damage to the creditor.” 125 Additionally,
“in the absence of damage produced by the State, there is no action.” 126
The application of Perry to the Argentine pesification is flawed.
Perry is not founded on the monetary paradigm, but rather on the principle that a plaintiff must be compensated for breach of contract with
expectation damages, in an amount not to exceed his expectation value.
Therefore, Perry does not apply to the Argentine crisis for two reasons.
First, Argentine law is a civil law system and the creditor always has
recourse to specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract.
This is strikingly different from the common law, where specific performance is the exception rather than the rule. 127 For example, the French
Civil Code declares that contracts must be performed in good faith, 128
and stipulates that an obligation to give implies an obligation to deliver
the thing, and to preserve it until delivery. 129 Similarly, the Argentine
Code stipulates that the creditor, in case of non-performance of a contract, has the right to choose from among the following measures: (1)
force performance of the obligation, (2) obtain performance by a third
party at the debtor’s expense, or (3) obtain appropriate damages. 130
How is the specific performance of a money obligation to be determined? In the civil law tradition, nominalism maintains that monetary
obligations should be discharged at the numerical sum of the currency
established in the contract. 131 Traditionally, the French Civil Code 132 and
most Latin American codes embraced nominalism. The Argentine Civil
Code established nominalism in regards to money obligations in national
currency (Article 619), but Article 617, under its original wording,
125.
126.
127.

Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 29.
Id.
Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective,
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528-30 (2004).
128. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
129. In civil law, obligations are traditionally classified into three categories:
obligations to give, obligations to do, and obligations not to do. See SAUL LITVINOFF,
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1992).
130. CODIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] art. 505 (Arg.).
131. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA 443 (1975).
132. C. CIV. art. 1895.
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considered obligations to give money that lacked legal tender quality as
an obligation to give goods (as opposed to money). 133 Convertibility
Law No. 23928 modified Article 617 by providing that obligations
denominated in foreign currency were money obligations. 134 It also
amended Article 610 to apply nominalism to obligations denominated in
foreign currency: “If the debtor’s obligation is to deliver a certain
quantity of a certain kind of money, the debtor fulfills his obligation by
giving the designated kind of money on the maturity’s day.” 135 Therefore, in the case of contracts denominated in dollars, the specified kind
of money is dollars, and so the creditor can obtain specific performance
of the obligation to give dollars. 136
Furthermore, unlike New Deal measures, Argentine Decree
260/2002 allowed free circulation of the U.S. dollar and established a
free exchange market. 137 The Argentine government did not suppress
the circulation of U.S. dollars, but rather substituted a dirty float 138 for
the currency board. Pesification of bank deposits at the rate of $1.40
pesos to US$1, unlike the repayment of private bonds in non-convertible
dollars, implied high opportunity costs for dollar depositors; these costs
remained under the new exchange rate system. Therefore, even if expectation damages were applied, pesification caused real damage to depositors at the moment of its passage. 139 Moreover, as Justice Argibay
rightly pointed out in Massa, there was no evidence that the economic
value fixed by Decree 214/2002 was equivalent to the capital deposited,

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. art. 619.
Law No. 23.928, Mar. 28, 1991 [Art. 11] B.O. No. 27104 (Arg.).
Id.
This is a literal application of the Argentine Civil Code. If the debtor is unable
to give the designated kind at the maturity of the obligation, he defaults on it, but the
obligation is not extinguished. See Horacio Tomás Liendo (h.), Los pesificadores
reniegan de su tempestad (genus nunquam perit), La Ley [L.L.] 1299, 1300-01 (2002F) (Arg.), available at http://www.liendo.com.ar/html/sitio/publicaciones/casopesifi
cacion2.pdf. Yet Congress could have modified Article 505 of the Civil Code laying
down expectation damages as the only remedy for breach of financial contracts during
the state of emergency.
137. See id. at 1305.
138. Dirty float (or managed floating rate system) is “[a] system in which a country’s currency is allowed to float freely in the foreign exchange market within certain
bounds; drastic changes in the value of the currency are mitigated by central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market.” ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D.
TOLLISON, ECONOMICS 853 (1986).
139. Macías, supra note 101.
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because: (1) it is dogmatic to assume that the depositor intended to
employ this capital for purchasing services and goods in the internal
market; and (2) even within the internal market, some goods (i.e., real
estate) increased in the same proportion as the U.S. dollar in the free
exchange market. 140
Thus, it is not Perry or its brethren, but rather U.S. v. Bankers’
Trust Co., Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., and United States
et al. v. Bankers’ Trust Co. et al., that became relevant for sustaining
pesification. As former Justices Moliné O’Connor and López held in
Provincia de San Luis, Perry addressed the case of Government bonds,
where the key statement was that Congress cannot exercise its monetary
powers as a way of unilaterally modifying its own freely assumed
obligations:
The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money
on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a power
vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may
depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of
141
the essence of the credit which is so pledged.

Given that this factual condition was absent in the Argentine cases,
why did the Court get into trouble by invoking Perry instead of simply
resorting to Norman, where the sovereign power of Congress freely
reigns? 142
In the author’s view, unlike Justices Belluscio and Maqueda, Justice
Highton de Nolasco correctly cited U.S. v. Bankers’ Trust Co in her
opinion in Bustos, thus properly applying the monetary paradigm. She
explained that Convertibility Law 23928 “established the . . . convertibility with the U.S. dollar, a new and full-fledged nominalism, desindexation, and the inclusion of foreign currency under the obligations to give

140. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/2006, “Massa, Juan A.
v. E.N.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-II-185) at 20 (Arg.).
141. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) at 29 (Arg.).
142. Julio C. Crivelli, Se avecina un gravísimo error: la redolarización. Enseñanzas
del fallo “Perry” v. Estados Unidos, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2002-IV-1404)
(stating that the relevance of Perry had been wrongly stressed); see Eduardo Conesa, El
caos monetario argentinode 2002 y su resolución (Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur), La
Ley [L.L.] (2002-D-1201) (Arg.) (advocate of pesification mentions Norman).

2009

DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA

797

sums of money as if it were national currency.” 143 Echoing Arthur
Nussbaum, Justice Highton drew a distinction between “legal tender”
[curso legal] and “compulsory tender” [curso forzoso].
For Nussbaum, legal tender denotes the quality of non-refusable
money, that is, the rule that the payee cannot refuse a payment in lawful
money made by the payor. 144 In contrast, compulsory tender is the inconvertibility of paper money established by law; in other words, compulsory tender likewise denotes an aspect of the relationship between the
issuer and the holder of paper currency. 145 In American history, the
expression “legal tender” is associated with the Acts of 1862 and 1863,
which made U.S. notes – i.e., nonconvertible paper money – a legal
tender in payment of all debts, public and private. 146 In Argentine
history, the expression “compulsory tender” was used to the same effect:
to denote the quality of legal tender as applied to paper money that has
become inconvertible. Like “legal tender” in the American sense,
“compulsory tender” in the Argentine sense tends to signify the quality
of legal tender of irredeemable paper money with respect to debts and
taxes. 147 Legal tender, as distinct from compulsory tender, can also exist
in a convertibility regime. “Legal tender” in this sense is much the same
as national currency or lawful money. Thus, pesos were not compulsory
tender under the peg, but they certainly were legal tender, because only
pesos had releasing power with respect to taxes and other State-related
obligations.
Highton claims that when Congress declares “compulsory tender”,
it can also fix the exchange rate of the new inconvertible money. 148
Accordingly, Congress could follow three different variants: paper
money could be established as compulsory tender (a) at par or face
value, (b) at the market value, or (c) at some intermediate value between
the nominal value and the market value. Highton implied that Congress
is empowered to opt for any of these alternatives, which means that it
can fix a rate of $1.40 pesos for US$1.00, even when the free exchange

143. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) at 61 (Arg.).
144. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 55-58.
145. Id.
146. Knox v. Lee & Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. 603 (1870); see also John Dawson & Frank Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on
Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 MICH. L. REV. 852, 898-922 (1935).
147. PABLO GERCHUNOFF ET AL., DESORDEN Y PROGRESO 50 n.46 (2008).
148. Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 63.
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rate is much higher. This opinion overruled the doctrine in Gowland v.
Mallmann, decided in 1886, according to which the establishment of
paper money as legal tender does not mean that it must be accepted at
par value or any other value lower than its market value. 149 Therefore,
the monetary argument, presumably embraced by Highton, states: (1)
Emergency Law 25445 150 changed the monetary system by establishing
Argentine paper currency as compulsory tender by substituting the irredeemable peso for the convertible peso; (2) in passing this law, Congress
exercised its sovereign powers to fix the exchange value of currency,
and private contractors must accept compulsory tender at the parity fixed
by Congress in cancellation of their dollar-denominated credits; and (3)
this would mean that banks are entitled to pay off deposits in irredeemable pesos at the rate fixed by Congress.
Though pesos became compulsory tender when the currency board
was abolished, this did not establish pesification as a way of exercising
congressional power to fix the exchange rate of inconvertible pesos. In
effect, in establishing nominalism, Articles 617 and 619, as amended by
Convertibility Law 23.928, provided that payment in dollars was the
adequate form of paying off dollar-denominated obligations. Under convertibility’s nominalism, neither dollars nor inconvertible pesos were
compulsory tender simply because, by definition, there is no compulsory
tender in a convertibility regime. Though dollar convertibility can misleadingly be assimilated to the classic currency board under the gold
standard, the author contends that Norman is not applicable to the pesification of dollar-denominated contracts.
From 1899 to 1914 Argentina maintained a regime of gold convertibility administered by a currency board. Conversion Law No 3.871,
passed on October 31, 1899, established gold convertibility of paper
pesos. 151 According to this regime – which would extend over a period
of fifteen years – the currency board was to exchange paper pesos for
gold pesos at the rate of 2.27 paper pesos to one gold peso. 152
The obvious difference between a gold standard currency board and
a dollar currency board is that metal currency is coined by the govern149. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 6/10/1985, “Gowland v.
Mallmann,” Fallos (1985-29-304) (Arg.).
150. Law No. 25.445, June 25, 2001, B.O. 29675 (Arg.).
151. GERARDO DELLA PAOLERA & ALAN M. TAYLOR, STRAINING AT THE ANCHOR:
THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD AND THE SEARCH FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILITY,
1880-1935 120 (2001).
152. Id. at 119.

2009

DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA

799

ment, while U.S. dollars are issued by a foreign government. Consequently, when contracts are denominated in the national currency,
Congress’s power to coin or issue national currency and to regulate the
value thereof can affect those contracts. Congress can exercise this
power either by introducing a new national currency or by varying the
gold or dollar parity of the old currency. This feature of the monetary
paradigm can be described as Congress having the power to change the
internal denomination of contracts. In contrast, when contracts are lawfully denominated in a foreign currency (external denomination), the
Government cannot modify the economic value of those contracts by
simply exercising monetary powers. Private contracts in the gold clause
cases were denominated in gold dollars and therefore, bond holders’ attempt to maintain the gold clauses after Congress had established legal
tender and prohibited the circulation of gold, were incompatible with
Congress’s power to change the monetary system and establish legal
tender.
Still, bank deposits in the pesification cases were typically denominated in U.S. dollars, and the U.S. Government had already declared that
paper dollars were legal tender in 1933. As Justice Adolfo R. Vázquez
wrote in Provincia de San Luis, Norman would have been relevant in the
Argentine cases if bank deposits had been denominated in convertible
pesos. 153 The Court then could have truly argued that Congress’s
“monetary sovereignty” implied that depositors could not claim convertible pesos (or the amount of inconvertible pesos needed to purchase
convertible pesos) in the free exchange. Pesification of bank deposits
denominated in U.S. dollars, however, was neither a monetary decision
nor a necessary consequence thereof.
VI. THE VALORIST PARADIGM
The previous section of this Article concluded that the conversion
of dollar deposits into peso deposits at an official rate lower than the free
exchange rate was not a necessary consequence of Congress exercising
its sovereign attributions over legal tender. This is not to say that
Argentine law disallows adaptations of the economic value of contracts
when unforeseeable economic circumstances (i.e., different from those
existing or foreseeable at the moment of the contract formation) break

153. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) at 93 (Arg.).
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the equilibrium of the contract, making its performance too onerous for
one of the parties and therefore, inconsistent with equity. Instead of
contractual adjustment by changing the baseline for estimating expectation damages (for example, the strategy pursued in Perry v. United
States), the traditional form of adjusting the value of contracts in civilian
countries applies the revaluation principle, the theory of unforeseeability
(“imprevision”), or related doctrines that adopt a valorist paradigm of
monetary obligations. 154 Valorism holds that debts must be discharged
at their real economic value. 155 This position was introduced by German
jurisprudence. The German hyperinflation of 1918 to 1923 depreciated
all debts to an extreme degree, which made fulfillment at the nominal
amount inconsistent with the civilian principles of bona fides and rebus
sic stantibus (things thus standing). 156 On November 28, 1923, the Fifth
Senate of the Reichsgericht reversed its previous doctrine and issued the
famous Aufwertungsurteil, which ordered the revaluation of a mortgage
debt, thus adopting a position held by the Court of Appeals of Darmstadt
in decisions of March 29 and May 18, 1923. 157 The valorist paradigm
became widely used in Latin America in order to readjust contract
values that were affected by inflation. 158
Argentine civil courts, in effect, applied the valorist paradigm under
the heading of “theory of imprevision” to uphold revaluation of depreciated debts as a result of inflationary processes. In the 1960s, courts
abandoned nominalism by leveling up the nominal sums set in contracts,
fixing periodic performances or postponed execution with a view to
neutralize the distorting effects of inflation on the economic bases of
those contracts. 159 Thus, courts held that all contracts must be presumed
to contain an implicit rebus sic stantibus 160 clause. On the basis of this
principle, courts ruled that values set in contracts can be judicially recast
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

KARST & ROSENN, supra note 131, at 443-93.
Id.
RÜTHERS, supra note 5, at 64.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 206; RÜTHERS, supra note 5, at 64-69.
KARST & ROSENN, supra note 131, at 443-93.
See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN], 26/2/1964, “Felix
Sola v. Colonies and Farmhouses El Rodeo,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (1964-III600) (Arg.).
160. “A tacit condition attached to all treaties to the effect that they will no longer be
binding as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which they were based changes
to a substantial degree.” ENotes.com - West’s Encyclopedia of American Law - Rebus
Sic Stantibus, http://www.enotes.com/wests-law-encyclopedia/rebus-sic-stantibus (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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if new circumstances emerge that were not foreseeable and that substantially alter the financial equation of the bargain. Applying this doctrine, courts increased the nominal value of obligations fixed in contracts
when this value was depreciated by inflation, or decreased it when performance became excessively burdensome for one of the parties as a
consequence of the dollar denomination of the contract obligations or
the application of an index clause. The Argentine Supreme Court upheld revaluation in Pribluda de Hurevich v. Hernández 161 and Provincia
de Sante Fe v. Carlos Aurelio Nicchi 162 . Justice José Francisco Bidau
explained that “in the face of the persistence of this phenomenon
[inflation] and the extremes it reaches at present, it is not possible to
maintain legal principles that have become fictitious.” 163 Following
Hernández and Nicchi, various rulings held that revaluation was a way
to protect the right to property and to maintain the economic value of
debts. 164 The 1968 reform of the Civil Code expressly laid down the
theory of imprevision. 165 The Supreme Court later endorsed the valorist
paradigm in three 1976 decisions, declaring that failure to update the
amounts of defaulted obligations would amount to a violation of the
right to property. 166
Then, in the 1990s Argentina returned to nominalism in an attempt
to stop a long process of inflation and currency depreciation. Convertibility Law No. 23928 167 established nominalism with respect to
contracts in foreign currency by amending Articles 610 and 617 of the

161. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 30/11/1966, “Pribluda de
Hurevich v. Hernández,” Fallos (1966-266-223) (Arg.).
162. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 26/6/1967, “Provincia de
Sante Fe v. Carlos Aurelio Nicchi,” Fallos (1967-268-112) (Arg.).
163. Id. at 116.
164. For a helpful list of cases asserting that the revaluation of the original amount
does not make the debt more onerous bust just maintains its economic value, see
NARCISO J. LUGONES ET AL., LEYES DE EMERGENCIA, DECRETOS DE NECESIDAD Y
URGENCIA 164 nn.199 & 202 (1992).
165. CÓD. CIV. art. 1198 (Arg.).
166. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 9/9/1977, “La Amistad SRL v.
Iriarte Roberto Co.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (1977-IV-3) (ARG.); Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 23/9/1976, “Jose Raquel Valdez v. Nacion
Argentina,” Fallos (1976-295-937) (Arg); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación
[CSJN], 21/5/1976, “Amalia Camusso Vda. de Marino v. S.A. Perkins,” Fallos (1976294-434) (Arg.); see also Genaro R. Carrió, Judge Made Law Under a Civil Code, 41
LA. L. REV. 993 (1981).
167. See Law No. 23.928, Mar. 28, 1991, [Art. 11] B.O. No. 27104 (Arg.).
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Civil Code. 168 Argentine courts were not allowed – and indeed had no
need – to go back to the valorist paradigm during the convertibility
decade (1991-2001). In January 2001, amidst the crisis, Article 5 of
Emergency Law No. 25561 169 maintained the wording of Articles 610
and 617 of the Civil Code established by the Convertibility Law. 170
As explained above, imprevision theory indicates a leveling up of
nominal amounts as the natural response to depreciation of the currency
in which contracts are denominated. In contrast, leveling down of
nominal amounts would seem to be the natural response for the converse
problem, when the economic value of contracts increases due to strong
deflation or appreciation of the currency in which contracts are denominated. 171 Though downward adjustment was never applied in such a
pure form in Argentina, there was a case of scaling down when
President Alfonsín issued the emergency Decree No. 1096/1985. This
decree created a new currency (“Australes”) and converted all indexed
debts denominated in the old currency (“Argentine Pesos”) into
Australes at a rate that periodically increased the value of Australes to
make up for Argentine Pesos indexation. 172 The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of this decree. In Provincia de la Pampa v. Esteban
Albano, the Court ruled that striking down Decree 1096/1985 for
violating the right to property would have required a demonstration that
the purchasing value on the maturity date was less than the value of the
nominal capital would have been if inflation remained at a similar level
as at the time of contract formation. 173
The valorist paradigm is thus one possible strategy to deal with U.S.
dollar denominated contracts when the depreciation of the national
currency causes an increase in the domestic purchasing power of the
dollar. In other words, when the national currency is unforeseeably devalued and, as a result, the economic basis of U.S. dollar denominated
contracts is seriously altered, Congress or courts could apply the valorist
paradigm in such a way as to reduce the nominal sum of dollars owed by

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

CÓD. CIV. arts. 610, 617.
Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810, art. 5 (Arg.).
C. CIV. art. 1895 (Fr.).
CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 281 (1982).
Decree No. 1096/1985, June 17, 1985, B.O. 24/VI/1985 (Arg.).
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/6/1988, “Provincia de la
Pampa v. Esteban Albano S.A.,” Fallos (1988-311-1155) ¶ 5 (Arg.). The same position
is maintained in Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 20/4/1989, “Luis A.
Porcelli v. Banco de la Nacion Argentina,” Fallos (1989-312-555) (Arg.).
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debtors to banks, and by banks to savers. Under the valorist paradigm,
however, Congress or courts could not vary the currency denomination
of contractual sums. The valorist paradigm allows only a variation of
nominal amounts and not a change in currency denomination.
As already noted, the valorist paradigm is well rooted in the
Argentine civil law tradition. It is easier for civilian courts to apply the
valorist paradigm than to utilize the emergency and the monetary
paradigms, which are both ultimately borrowed from U.S. sources.
Emergency Law No. 25561, however, did not apply the valorist paradigm for restructuring deposits and loans within the banking system in
the Argentine crisis. 174 On the contrary, that law explicitly maintained
nominalism. 175 The obvious question then, is why was the valorist alternative not invoked? Initially, it is important to note that the pure form of
applying the valorist paradigm would have been to reduce the nominal
amount of dollar denominated deposits to match the deposit pre-devaluation real value. If depositors are perfectly rational, this might have
exacerbated the existing demonstrations against the restructuring of
financial contracts.
Suppose, hypothetically, a deposit of US$1,000 before the crisis at
a parity of US $1 per $1, the peso is devalued up to a rate of $2 per US
$1; it is certain that the Government can only take one of the following
options: (i) pesify the deposit and nominally increase it by 20%, or (ii)
maintain the deposit in dollars but nominally decrease it by 40%. The
former case yields $1,200; the latter yields US$600. Which option is
less attractive? Despite a lack of experimental studies on this issue, a
substantial majority would likely answer that they dislike the second
option more, because this option vividly conveys a subjective feeling of
loss. 176 Of course, a perfectly rational agent would answer the question
on the basis of an ex ante estimation of the probability of devaluation or
revaluation of the peso until maturity of the obligation.
Article Eleven of Emergency Law No. 25561, however, did apply
an impure variant of the valorist paradigm – called “burden sharing” – to

174.
175.
176.

Law No. 25.561 art. 7, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.).
Id.
This is probably related to an asymmetry noted by Kahneman and Tversky:
people have greater aversion to losses than to objectively equivalent foregone gains. Cf.
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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mortgage loans outside the financial system. 177 This variant allows
pesification and therefore bypasses the problem of imperfect rationality
indicated above. Article Eleven awarded the parties to such contracts a
period no longer than 180 days to reach an agreement on the readjustment of the contract in such a way as to equitably share the burdens of
the devaluation. 178 In the absence of agreement, the norm allowed the
parties to have recourse to the official system of mediation and to start
legal proceedings; the Executive Branch was empowered to issue executive orders readjusting the obligations on the grounds of the theory of
imprevision (Article 1198 of the Civil Code) and the principle of
“burden sharing.” 179 Decree 214/2002 then pesified and indexed these
loans (by consumer product prices or wages, depending on the amount
and nature of the loan). 180 The decree also provided that judges should
proceed to a fair revision of loans if the adjusted debt was disproportionately lower or higher than the value of the thing purchased at the
moment of payment. 181
On the basis of Article Eleven of Law No. 25561 and Decree
214/2002, a prevailing trend of doctrinal opinion in Argentina defended
judicial revision of the value of contracts denominated in dollars, in the
form of conversion into pesos at an intermediate rate resulting from
splitting the difference between $1 and the free market exchange rate. 182
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Law No. 25.561 art. 11, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810.
Id.
Id.
Decree No. 214/2002, Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830, art. 2 (Arg.).
Id. art. 8.
See, e.g., Ariel Ariza, Revisión judicial de los contratos en la emergencia
económica, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] 9 Número especial (2002) (Arg.); Juan José
Casiello, El impacto de las normas de emergencia en el derecho monetario. La
‘pesificación’, La Ley [L.L.] 19 (2002) (Arg.); Gabriel B. Chausovsky & Ángel L.
Moia, Un caso de equitativa recomposición de la obligación de dar moneda extranjera
entre privados alcanzado por la legislación de emergencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina
[J.A.] (2003-IV-590) (Arg.); Andrés Gil Domínguez, La teoría del esfuerzo compartido
y los depósitos bancarios, La Ley [L.L.] (2004-1) (Arg.); Alejandro Gaido, La
naturaleza jurídica del esfuerzo compartido, El Derecho [E.D.] (2004-209-793) (Arg.);
Carlos G Gerscovich, Discordancias de la pesificación en el marco de la crisis y la
emergencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-34) (Arg.); Lilian N. Gurfinkel de
Wendy, Algo más sobre la teoría del esfuerzo compartido: estado actual de la
jurisprudencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-III-674) (Arg.); Francisco
Junyent Bas, Pesificación. Los contratos privados, las deudas en mora y la teoría de la
imprevisión y el esfuerzo compartido, El Derecho [E.D.] (2003-202-779) (Arg.); Jorge
W. Peyrano, La pretensión distributiva del esfuerzo compartido. Análisis provisorio de
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While doctrinal commentators widely endorsed an equal splitting of the
difference, civilian courts were divided between equal splitting and a
strong debtor-relief splitting of thirty percent to seventy percent. 183 In
all cases, judicial revision of loans was defended on the grounds of
contractual equity and good faith.
Law 25798 (modified by Law 25908 and regulated by Decree
1284/2003) created a system of mortgage restructuring by which Banco
de la Nación Argentina reimburses the original debtor for the difference
between the pesified debt and the readjusted debt. 184 This system sought
to relieve debtors who took loans of under $100,000 to purchase residential property. Finally, Article Six of Law 26167 established that
judges should make the equitable readjustment of contract under the
doctrines of unforseeability, unfair enrichment, abuse of rights, and
unconscionability, as well as the constitutional rights of access to decent
housing and the protection of family. 185 It also established that judges
could not readjust debts so that the revised amount exceeded the pesified
debt at a rate of US$1 to $1 peso plus thirty percent of the difference
between this rate and the free exchange rate. 186
In Rinaldi, decided on March 15, 2007, the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of this regime and overturned a Civil
Court of Appeals decision that had split the difference by fifty percent. 187 The Court ruled that the conflict between creditors and debtors
must be resolved by restoring the economic equilibrium lost by the great

aspectos procesales de la ‘pesificación’, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] Tomo (2002-I1078) (Arg.); Jorge W Peyrano, Una nueva pretensión: la distributiva del esfuerzo
compartido. Comentarios procesales sobre el régimen de ‘pesificación’ forzosa de
obligaciones en moneda extranjera no vinculadas al sistema financiero, El Derecho
[E.D.] (2002-196-861) (Arg.); Ramón Daniel Pizarro, La Degradación del Derecho de
crédito en la Argentina, La Ley [L.L.] (2002-50) (Arg.); Roberto A. Vázquez Ferreira,
Cambio de circunstancias y distribución del riesgo contractual, La Ley [L.L.] (200240) (Arg.).
183. Ethel Humphreys, La hipoteca: pesificación, dolarización y esfuerzo
compartido. Panorama jurisprudencial de la C. Nac. Civ. de la Capital Federal,
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-IV-1555) (Arg.).
184. Law No. 25.798, Nov. 7, 2003, B.O. 30272 (Arg.).
185. Law No. 26.167, Nov. 29, 2006, B.O. 31043 (Arg.).
186. Id.
187. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 15/3/2007, “Rinaldi, Francisco
Augusto y otro v. Guzman Toledo, Ronal Constante y otra s/ ejecución hipotecaria,”
Fallos (2007-330-855) (Arg.).
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devaluation of the peso. 188 Of course, this is essentially the theory of
imprevision laid down in Article 1198 of the Civil Code. The Court
thus defended the constitutionality of a legislative scheme based on the
idea of burden sharing.
Burden sharing is a morally attractive notion – more so than the
idea that individual rights may be sacrificed for the sake of the collective
good. It is central to the emergency paradigm. On the basis of burden
sharing, pesification at an intermediate rate could have been applied to
all financial contracts, without recourse to the emergency and the
monetary paradigms. The question remains: why was this paradigm not
used?
The explanation is not doctrinal, but rather political. First, in
Argentina and elsewhere, banks are not regarded as contributors to
social welfare but rather as powerful and greedy organizations, in
defense of which it would have been only grotesque to wield the theory
of imprevision and moral arguments grounded on equity. This is particularly important in a country like Argentina, where public discourse is
largely insensitive to the propositions of economic theory and the results
of experimental economics. 189 It would have been politically impracticable for the Government to apply the theory of imprevision, especially
under the burden sharing variant, to defend banks and curtail savers’
rights.
Rent seeking also explains why the valorist paradigm was not an
attractive option for restructuring banking deposits and loans. “Asymmetrical pesification” at a $1 to US $1 rate was more profitable for rent
seekers (i.e., politically connected corporate debtors) than burden
sharing. The upshot of “asymmetric pesification” was that, while large
tradable sector corporations enjoyed a pre-devaluation exchange rate for
paying off their debts to banks, individual debtors who took mortgage
loans in notaries’ bureaus to buy their homes had to pay $1.40 pesos for
each U.S. dollar borrowed. 190 Thus, while the valorist paradigm and
equity guided the restructuring of small mortgage loans in the informal
financial sector, realpolitik led the way for liquefying corporations’
dollarized debts.

188.
189.

Id.
See GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE (2006) (a pathbreaking theory of public discourse in democratic regimes).
190. Decree No. 214/2002 of Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830, art. 3 (Arg.).
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VII. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PARADIGM
The social justice paradigm derives from a doctrine concerning the
social function of property, embraced by socialist thought and the
Catholic Church. 191 This paradigm maintains that the reshaping of property in financial crises must be accomplished by assigning priority to the
worst off. 192 The Government and courts should therefore ensure that as
a result of such reshaping, the greater burdens befall the best off, and the
lesser ones fall on the worst off. Under this scheme, small debtors and
depositors are prioritized, particularly when information about the
overall economic condition of each debtor or depositor is difficult to
obtain.
Though the social justice paradigm did not guide the reshaping of
property rights in Argentina, it played a role in a number of “exceptions”
laid down by Presidential or Ministerial regulations. For example,
Resolution Number 46, issued by the Ministry of Economy on February
6, 2002, allowed all individuals or corporations to exclude deposited
amounts from the rescheduling if such amounts were applied to the payment of salaries and wages, payments related to social security, severance payments, compensation for death or accident, disability insurance,
and payment of social security benefits, under certain conditions. 193
Similarly, Decree 905/02 gave an option to swap rescheduled deposits
for Bodens in U.S. dollars to: (1) holders of deposits of amounts up to
US$10,000; (2) depositors over 75 years of age; and (3) individuals with
severe health afflictions or severance payments beneficiaries. 194 Such
exceptions are justified on social justice or humanitarian grounds and
have little economic impact. Rather than an independent paradigm, they
are indispensable qualifications to any of the other paradigms.
Nevertheless, the social justice paradigm found articulate expression as an independent paradigm in two judicial opinions: Bustos and
Rinaldi. Though these opinions did not constitute the holding of the
majority decisions, they indicate that the social justice paradigm was
starting to have a hold over the Supreme Court. Thus, in a minority
191. See encyclicals of Pius XI, John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II mentioned supra
note 6.
192. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Revised Edition (1999); Derek Partit,
Equality and Priority, in IDEALS OF EQUALITY (Andrew Mason ed., 1998) (The social justice
paradigm comes close to Rawls’s theory of justice).
193. Resolution No. 46 art. 2, Feb. 7, 2002, B.O. 29833 (Arg.).
194. Decree No. 905/2002, June 1, 2002, B.O. 29911 (Arg.).
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opinion in Bustos, Justice Eugenio R. Zaffaroni differentiated three
groups of depositors in terms of their economic capacity: (a) holders of
deposits exceeding US$140,000, (b) holders of deposits in the
US$70,000-140,000 range, and (c) holders of deposits of less than
US$70,000. 195 Zaffaroni proposed a different solution for each group.
He opined that the largest burdens deriving from the state of necessity
should fall on group (a), to which pesification at the $1.40 peso per
dollar rate, plus correction by “CER”, was constitutionally applicable. 196
Group (c), which Zaffaroni presumed as the worst off, was entitled to
receive the amount of pesos needed to purchase the original amount of
deposited dollars in the free exchange market. 197 A mixed solution was
suitable for group (b): for deposits up to US$70,000 they would be
treated like group (c) and, for the amount ranging between US$70,000
and US$140,000, they would be treated like group (a). 198 Notably,
Justice Zaffaroni invoked no constitutional text in support of his redistributive scheme; he simply stated that it is “fair” to allocate burdens in
proportion to the amount of the deposits. 199
In Rinaldi, Justices Maqueda and Highton de Nolasco declared that
the restructuring mechanism established by Law 26167 is coherent with
Article Fourteen bis of the Constitution and various international treaties
incorporated into the Argentine Constitution in 1994, which protect
family and the access to decent housing. 200 Maqueda and Highton de
Nolasco also stated that this decision resolves the conflict between creditors’ constitutional right to property and debtors’ constitutional right to
housing, because the law makes both parties share the burden of readjustment. 201 In his dissent, Justice Carmen Argibay said:
[T]here is a serious internal contradiction in the view that finds a
conflict or tension between the creditor’s right to foreclose the
mortgage and the debtor’s right to decent housing. The thing that
works as housing is also an economic good that can be used by his
owner to obtain money, be it through its sale, or through its being
used as collateral . . . . Therefore, if the thing is an economic good at

195. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49 (Arg.).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. “Rinaldi,” Fallos (2007-330-855) at ¶45 (Arg.).
201. Id. ¶46.
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the moment of its sale or being affected as collateral, it also must be
an economic good at the moment of its delivery to the buyer or to the
202
creditor who forecloses the mortgage.

The social justice paradigm has two obvious shortcomings. First,
the assumption that by differentiating groups of depositors by the
amounts deposited, the Court can achieve social justice is a something of
a fiction. For example, the rich could have large deposits in off shore
banks, thus eluding their justice-based obligations. They could also invest in real property, luxury goods, or paintings. Taxation and a redistributive scheme based on universal criteria, like a basic minimum income, are far more efficacious ways of achieving social equality.
Second, differentiating property protection in terms of the amount deposited, if generalized, would produce a stunted banking system in
Argentina; it would encourage depositors of amounts exceeding
US$70,000 to run away from the local banking system. Curiously,
Justice Zaffaroni said in Bustos, “[I]t is important that small and medium
depositors preserve their trust in the banking system, both to promote
those sectors’ savings and to avoid the holding of money and titles
outside the banking system, with the resulting dangers of victimization
in moments of social conflict.” 203 Justice Zaffaroni failed to mention the
importance of maintaining the trust of large depositors. Perhaps
Zaffaroni thought that large depositors would not remain in the
Argentine banking system. But, of course, the Court’s decisions are not
exogenous to this expected event. Large depositors could maintain a
greater degree of trust if the Court acknowledged their claims. Justice
Highton de Nolasco’s doctrine that the protection of creditors’ rights can
in principle be qualified by debtors’ rights to housing would, in cases of
conflict between these two kinds of rights, also reduce the size of
domestic financial markets. Because the right to housing could systematically threaten mortgage credits, this doctrine would deter lenders from
supplying mortgage credits in Argentina.
Social justice doctrines that create legal uncertainty in savers and
investors are typically counter-productive: they hurt the group that they
seek to defend, namely, the worst off. The lack of a large banking system generally yields deleterious effects on undercapitalized individuals.
For instance, the undersupply of mortgage creditors deprives many individuals from a decentralized form of access to decent housing. Of
202.
203.

Id. ¶32.
Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49.
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course, Argentina already has stunted financial markets as a result of
repetitive waves of macroeconomic collapses and emergency decrees.
By discouraging sizable bank deposits and mortgage credits, Zaffaroni’s
and Highton de Nolasco’s doctrines would only exacerbate this problem.
However, the Court could still endorse these doctrines on moral
grounds, regardless of their consequences. On the one hand, Justice
Zaffaroni was concerned about some consequences (“dangers of victimization”). 204 On the other hand, as Guido Pincione and Fernando Tesón
have shown, counterproductive public discourse (within which some
judicial opinions might be included) could hardly become transparent
moral discourse. 205 If a judge acknowledged that the moral doctrine she
defends would damage the worst off, her discourse would be pragmatically self-defeating and morally counter-productive, because by this
acknowledgement she would cancel the persuasive force of her doctrine.
Because moral language has a persuasive function, counter-productive
public discourse presents an ineradicable tension between transparency
and pragmatic effectiveness. 206
VIII. THE BANKRUPTCY PARADIGM
The application of the emergency and monetary paradigms to deal
with the Argentine crisis was beset by doctrinal difficulties. The
Argentine Government and courts failed to discuss alternative constitutional paradigms for designing the reshaping of property rights.
This Article suggests, in particular, that an important paradigm has
been ignored, called the bankruptcy paradigm. This paradigm is wholly
consistent with the property and contract structure of liberal constitutional regimes. More generally, this Article asserts that it is important to
analyze the benefits of implementing a standing scheme of crisis resolution under a new paradigm that could minimize the damage to the
property and contract structure. This is necessary to develop a financial
and banking system, capable of fostering citizens’ well being and of
financing innovative entrepreneurial initiatives. Emerging market countries, where new crises cannot be discarded off hand, would be well

204.
205.

Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49.
See PINCIONE & TESÓN, supra note 189, at 142-75 (an excellent analysis of the
“moral turn” in counter-productive public discourse).
206. The form in which this point is expressed owes much to Ezequiel Spector’s
thoughtful comments on Pincione and Teson’s theory. Id.
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advised in investigating the economic and legal underpinnings of this
proposed scheme.
The emergency view of government takings in the midst of
financial crises is strengthened by the fact that the public is unaware of
the technicalities of the banking system. For instance, many small
depositors are unaware that even solvent banks cannot pay a majority of
their liabilities on demand. Milton Friedman illuminates this point:
It is easy to see why a run would cause an insolvent bank to fail
sooner than it otherwise might. But why should a run cause a
responsible and solvent bank trouble? The answer is linked to the
one of the most misleading words in the English language – the word
“deposit,” when used to refer to a claim against a bank. If you
“deposit” currency in a bank, it is tempting to suppose that the bank
takes your greenbacks and “deposits” them in a bank vault for
safekeeping until you ask for them. It does nothing of the kind. If it
did, where would the bank get income to pay its expenses, let alone
to pay interest on deposits? The bank may take a few of the
greenbacks and put them in a vault as a “reserve.” The rest it lends
to someone else, charging the borrower interest, or uses to buy an
interest-bearing security.
If, as is the typical case, you deposit not currency but checks on
other banks, your bank does not even have currency in hand to
deposit in a vault. It has only a claim on another bank for currency,
which it typically will not exercise because other banks have
matching claims on it. For every $100 of deposits, all the banks
together have only a few dollars of cash in their vaults. We have a
“fractional reserve banking system.” The system works very well, so
long as everyone is confident that he can always get cash for his
deposits and therefore only tries to get cash when he really needs it.
Usually, new deposits of cash roughly equal withdrawals, so that the
small amount in reserve is sufficient to meet temporary discrepancies. However, if everyone tries to get cash at once, the
situation is very different – a panic is likely to occur, just as it does
when someone cries “fire” in a crowded theatre and everyone rushes
207
to get out.

The bankruptcy paradigm arises from the recognition that bankruptcy legislation must be understood as consistent with protection of
private property. True, it has been held that bankruptcy law is inconsistent with a libertarian system of property rights because it allows the

207.

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 72-73 (1990).
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non-contractual extinction of the insolvent debtor’s debts and, in doing
so, legitimizes the non-voluntary transfer of creditor rights. 208 As
Robert Nozick himself admits, it is always problematic for the naturalrights tradition to accommodate risk-spreading schemes in a principled
way. 209 The author concedes that Nozick’s point can be extended to the
reshaping of property rights under a bankruptcy regime. However,
bankruptcy procedures are consistent with the right to property as
established in a classical liberal constitution. In fact, as discussed in Part
II of this Article, both the United States and Argentine constitutions
empower Congress to pass bankruptcy legislation. Today, bankruptcy
legislation enjoys widespread acceptance in liberal democratic countries
and, therefore, any theory about property rights should accommodate
this fact.
Instead of passing emergency legislation when there is a crisis in
the banking system, a more adequate solution, the author contends, is to
enact standing legislation to take effect during bank runs and financial
crises that differentiates insolvent from solvent banks, and saves the
latter from being eventually driven into bankruptcy. Just as bankruptcy
legislation seeks to avoid an inefficient race for the debtors’ assets, the
central function of a bank restructuring mechanism should be to avoid
panicky cash withdrawals and the fire selling of bank assets, with the
associated loss in value. Coupled together, bankruptcy law and a bank
restructuring mechanism allow the temporary suspension of property
rights as the only possible means of maximizing the observance of
property rights. In order to maximize the net worth of the depositors’
rights, the bank restructuring mechanism would allow the suspension
and reorganization of remedies. Functionally, this mechanism could be
regarded as a bankruptcy-like process. Therefore, the Constitution
allows Congress to pass legislation for restructuring bank debts,
especially in the context of bank runs and illiquidity crises. Because this
type of legislation is a variety of bankruptcy legislation, its constitutionality could be sustained without recourse to the emergency or monetary
paradigms. Even if Congress failed to establish a standing bank restructuring piece of legislation, it should be understood that Congress
retains its power to do so once a crisis has started. Naturally, Congres-

208. Peter Morriss, How Capitalism Infringes Property Rights, 31 POL. STUD. 656
(1983); see also Chandran Kukathas, Does Capitalism Infringe Property Rights? A
Reply to Peter Morriss, 32 POL. STUD. 611 (1984).
209. NOZICK, supra note 52, at 75.
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sional powers do not diminish in the face of a crisis. A bank run is a
market failure, due in part to a lack of coordination, which diminishes
the net worth of banks’ assets. 210 Congressional power to pass bankruptcy legislation covers all forms of state-regulated mechanisms for
collecting creditor rights when consensual renegotiations are subject to
high transaction costs. An emergency declaration is simply not a prerequisite for Congress to exercise this power.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to espouse the bankruptcy
paradigm in detail. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to explain how this
paradigm might be brought to bear in practice. One possible conception
of this paradigm consists of three complementary strategies, all of which
are designed to solve banking illiquidity and insolvency in countries that
have a hard peg, formal dollarization, or extended de facto dollarization.
In all cases, the Central Bank cannot act as a lender of last resort and
therefore, a dollar liquidity run has a great propensity to become a bank
run. The background monetary policy of these strategies is to preserve
financial dollarization of stock and to adopt the margin conversion of
contracts into the national currency (pesos). This means that the Government consolidates all pesos in circulation (as well as quasi-monies)
into a new national currency: the “nonconvertible peso.” In this way,
the function of the U.S. dollar as preserver of value is maintained because existing financial contracts are not “pesified”; at the same time,
the nonconvertible peso is established as a unit of denomination and a
means of payment of new financial contracts and all non-financial
contracts. This consolidation of the national currency solves the problems of the nominal flexibility of public spending and the sticky nature
of salaries in the unionized sectors because depreciation of the floating
national currency automatically deflates public and private salaries,
which are denominated in the nonconvertible currency. 211
The first “nonconvertible peso” strategy (“Strategy I”) corrects
balance-sheet mismatches arising from maintenance of dollarization of
the national currency. The goal of Strategy I is achieved by establishing
a “two-pole circuit breaker.” The “positive pole,” proposed by Eduardo

210. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 3, 401-19 (1983).
211. Augusto De la Torre et al., Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and
Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
2980, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=352380.
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Levy Yeyati 212 , is to automatically suspend the convertibility of deposits
into currency (“internal convertibility”) when the liquidity of banks falls
below a certain threshold as a result of a systemic crisis. In this
proposal, the suspension of convertibility clause is ex ante included in
financial contracts, so that suspension of convertibility in the given
conditions does not constitute a breach of contract.
Thus, in the author’s view, the “negative pole” of the “circuit
breaker” is to shorten the average length of loans in the tradables and
other high-profit sectors. Just as many bank credits are awarded on a
variable interest rate, all credits given to large domestic or multinational
corporations should include a variable maturity period. It is conceded
that this form of pre-cancellation of credits may only be applicable in a
limited scale, basically to large corporations that obtain liquidity through
exports. The usefulness of this mechanism, however, cannot be summarily discarded. For instance, when systemic illiquidity exceeds a certain limit, the regulator authorizes banks to call in their loans to oil corporations by anticipating the maturity of those loans. Even when this
double pole circuit breaker is not explicitly provided for ex ante in financial contracts, the bankruptcy paradigm constitutionally allows its imposition by ex post facto legislation. This is because all contracts are
subject to an “implicit bankruptcy clause”; if repayments become impossible, the government is empowered to establish procedures that maximize the expected repayment for all creditors by maximizing the net
worth of the debtors’ assets.
The second strategy (“Strategy II”) allows banks confronted with a
systemic crisis to issue freely negotiable notes in order to repay time
deposits. These notes would not be redeemable in paper currency on
demand, but rather after a variable period of months with an annual
interest payable at the end of this period. These bank notes would have
the same qualities attributed to bank notes in regimes of private money:

212. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized
Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12345, 2006), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12345.
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[T]he name or denomination a bank chooses for its issue will be
protected like a brand name or trade mark against unauthorized use,
and . . . there will be the same protection against forgery as against
that of any other document. These banks will then be vying for the
use of their issue by the public by making them as convenient to use
213
as possible.

“Private money” regimes are not a theoretical fiction. In fact, the
experience of free banking was documented in Scotland during the
period of 1695-1845. 214 In 1704, facing a bank run, the Bank of
Scotland suspended payments for four months and announced that it
would pay five percent annual interest for the period of the delay. Some
years later, this option was inserted onto the currency.215
In a banking crisis, solvent banks could issue notes that could work
as well as the Bank of Scotland’s notes in 1730. In fact, Argentina had
an experience with bank notes in 2002, when the Government awarded
certificates of rescheduled deposits (CEDROs) to depositors who did not
opt for the swap of deposits for bonds. 216 CEDROs were publicly traded
and negotiable through the secondary market. 217 Unlike CEDROs, bank
notes under Strategy II would be denominated in the same currency as
original deposits, and their circulation would be unrestricted. One virtue
of this scheme is that it would discriminate between solvent and
insolvent banks instead of lumping them together under the umbrella of
the systemic crisis. This would mitigate moral hazard problems.
These first two strategies address the problem of systemic illiquidity. The third strategy (“Strategy III”) provides a procedural resolution for banks that become insolvent. This procedure assumes that
banks have a corporate structure that includes a bank holding company
and two distinct subsidiaries: a payments bank and a financial
subsidiary. The liabilities of the payments bank consist of demand
accounts and small deposits, which are typically insured; the bank’s
assets are only prime-quality. The financial subsidiary handles all
remaining operations and is subject to regulatory requirements similar to
those of commercial banks. The procedure works as follows: when
213.

F. A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION

OF

AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES 38

214. LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING
DEBATE, 1800-1845 (1984).
215. Id. at 26.
216. Gómez-Giglio, supra note 46.
217. Id. at 403.

MONEY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY
(1976).
IN BRITAIN, THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND
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illiquidity is so serious that the bank’s solvency is threatened, the
regulator proceeds (by his own decision or at the bank’s request) to
freeze all the operations of the financial subsidiary (i.e., a sort of
permanent “circuit-breaker”). Equity is written off to zero and the remaining liabilities and assets are set to constitute a mutual fund, where
deposits are exchanged into senior shares and other liabilities are transformed into junior shares. The payments bank continues its operations
in nonconvertible currency until liquidation. 218
IX. THE EMERGENCY PARADIGM AND THE
BANKRUPTCY PARADIGM COMPARED
Figure 1 summarizes the doctrinal features of the paradigms for
property reshaping. Both the emergency and the bankruptcy paradigms
allow putting off the maturity of contracts, or the remedies for their
breach. This feature allows them to confront panicky withdrawals
during a bank run when the affected banks are solvent. By contrast, the
monetary and the valorist paradigms lack this feature, which is crucial
for dealing with bank runs. In endorsing vast redistributive powers, the
social justice paradigm can modify both time and nominal quantity of
deposits, but it can seriously alter the structure of incentives on which
any robust financial system relies.
Figure 1: Features of Property Reshaping Paradigms
Variations Time
Quantity
Denomination
Paradigms
(Nominal)
Internal
External
Emergency
Monetary
Valorist
Social Justice
Bankruptcy

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes*

No
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No

* In cases of insolvency.

Given the doctrinal features, the emergency and the bankruptcy
paradigms are the most effective in coping with a financial debacle,

218. Pablo E. Guidotti, Toward a Liquidity Risk Management Strategy for Emerging
Market Economies, in LATIN AMERICAN MACROECONOMIC REFORM, THE SECOND
STAGE § 8.2.3 (José Antonio González et al. eds., 2003).
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particularly when the banking system is healthy. While both paradigms
have similar doctrinal features, they critically differ in their institutional
implications.
Primarily, the bankruptcy paradigm has three fundamental advantages. The first advantage is a corollary of Mancur Olson’s famous
theory of groups. 219 The core postulate of this theory is that “the larger
the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of
a collective good,” where the collective good can be distributional gains
at the expense of the welfare of society. 220 The explanation of this
postulate is that “an individual member . . . gets only part of the benefit
of any expenditure he makes to obtain more of the collective good,”
which means that “he will discontinue his purchase of the collective
good before the optimal amount for the group as a whole has been
obtained.” 221 Olson draws nine second-level implications from his
theory, namely, propositions that follow from the theory together with
basic facts and microeconomic assumptions. 222 Among these implications, which serve to explain political phenomena in a democratic polity,
the third implication is relevant to explain the rent seeking function of
much of the legislation passed within the emergency paradigm:
“members of small groups have disproportionate organizational power
for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not
disappear over time in stable society.” 223 Therefore, “oligopolies and
other small groups have a greater likelihood of being able to organize for
collective action, and can usually organize with less delay, than large
groups.” 224 Though Olson himself failed to place great emphasis on
organizational speed, the author contends that this factor is critical for
understanding the particular shape that emergency measures often take
in financial debacles. 225
219. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (1971).
220. Id. at 35.
221. Id. at 35.
222. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 74 (1982).
223. Id. at 41.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. One clarification is in order. Olson concedes that “encompassing” labor
organizations (i.e., organizations that represent a large percentage of the work force)
can self-regulate their demands, and Lange and Garrett have shown that this variable is
positively associated with rent-seeking reduction and economic growth only if
accompanied by political control of government. See Peter Lange & Geoffrey Garrett,
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The idea of an emergency suggests that action must not be delayed,
and therefore that much deliberation and discussion is self-defeating.
Thus, because of time constraints, emergency powers are typically
exerted with greater discretion and less accountability than normal
powers. Typically, when a state of emergency is declared, a sort of rentseeking festival simultaneously opens to small redistributive coalitions.
Small interest groups who tend to have a successful rent-seeking
apparatus already in operation act quickly to obtain wealth redistributions in their favor. Because large unorganized groups work at a
much lower speed (if at all), small highly organized groups have the
greatest chance to get the greatest redistributive stakes. Faster decisionmaking speed, implicated by a state of emergency, only exacerbates the
organizational constraints of large groups, who for this reason are more
exposed to “exploitation” by small groups. This process reverses the
natural result of democratic decision-making. Furthermore, it violates
the second condition in Larreta’s four-condition test, 226 because rentseeking, by definition, does not promote the general welfare of the
people. 227
Emergency legislation in the United States highlights interesting
examples. There are helpful rent-seeking analyses of the labor
legislation backed in Lochner 228 and of the regulatory legislation endorsed in Carolene Products. 229
Rent-seeking interpretation of

The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980, 47 J. POL. 792, 792-827 (1985).
However, emergency situations offer such short-term opportunities for massive rentseeking that self-regulation cannot be rationally expected, even if the relevant groups
are encompassing, which in addition is not generally the case. For the list of the one
hundred most indebted corporations in Argentina on December 31, 2001, see
ALEJANDRO RODRÍGUEZ DIEZ, DEVALUACIÓN Y PESIFICACIÓN 230-33 (2003).
226. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico v. de la
Pesa,” Fallos (1934-172-21) (Arg.).
227. EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 138 (rent-seeking is “[t]he activity of
individuals who spend resources in the pursuit of monopoly rights granted by government; the process of spending resources in an effort to obtain an economic
transfer”); see also Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent- Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 291-303 (1974).
228. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 85
WASH. L. REV 5, 1469-1528 (2005).
229. Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, SUP. CT. REV. 397
(1987).
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Argentine emergency legislation in the same period is also available. 230
Emergency legislation in financial crises is amenable to a similar
analysis. For instance, the Great Depression was a great occasion for
rent-seeking. It is well known that with the abandonment of the gold
standard, President Roosevelt sought to raise the price of farm products,
which had been affected by the preceding period of deflation.
According to author Murray Rothbard, the reflationist program was agitated by agricultural and industrial lobbyists gathered in the Committee
for the Nation to Rebuild Prices and Purchasing Power. Rothbard
explains:
The Committee for the Nation at first included several hundred
industrial and agricultural leaders, and within a year its membership
reached over two thousand. Its recommendations, beginning with
going off gold and embargoing gold exports, and continuing through
devaluing the dollar and raising the price of gold, were fairly closely
231
followed by the Roosevelt administration.

In recent financial crises in emerging economies, various redistributive transfers have been empirically studied: transfers to the financial sector; transfers to large and foreign depositors; transfers to large,
bank-related borrowers; and benefits for high-income households. 232 In
the Argentine crisis, in particular, it is well documented now that transfers to large, bank-related borrowers were dominant in the “asymmetric
pesification” implemented by Decree 214/2002.233 It is likewise well
230. Horacio Spector & Sergio Berensztein, Business, Government, and Law, in A
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ARGENTINA 339-48 (Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor
eds., 2004).
231. Murray N. Rothbard, The New Deal and the International Monetary System, in
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND NEW DEAL MONETARY POLICY 94 (Garet Garrett &
Murray N. Rothbard eds., 1980).
232. Marina Halac & Sergio L. Schmukler, Distributional Effects of Crises: The
Role of Financial Transfers, (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3173,
2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer
/IW3P/IB/2004/01/20/000160016_20040120172705/Rendered/PDF/wps3173.pdf.
233. The currency board itself was probably a rent seeking institution. In fact, it
may be argued that Convertibility Plan institutions (central bank independence, privatization of public utilities under a monopoly regime, etc.) were established to allow
Government and its business allies to maximize rent seeking in the 1990s. Many
Argentines make a similar point by saying that convertibility was an “exchange rate
insurance.” See Sebastián Etchemendy, Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics
of Compensations in Argentina’s Economic Liberalization, 43 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y
1, 1-35 (2002) (an illuminating discussion of the political economy of Argentina’s
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known in Argentina that the former president of the powerful Argentine
Industrial Union (UIA), José Ignacio de Mendiguren, who was
appointed Minister of Production in early 2002, was a strong supporter
of asymmetric pesification. 234 In fact, lobbyists’ actions in favor of the
measure were revealed by Jorge Remes Lenicov, advisor and Minister of
Economy to President Duhalde, in an e-mail addressed to journalist
Joaquín Morales Solá and many other figures. 235 Remes Lenicov affirmed that the decision was taken as a result of pressures from Industrialists and bankers. 236 After this e-mail was widely diffused in the
media, banker Carlos Heller, from Asociación de Bancos Públicos y
Privados de la República Argentina (ABAPPRA.), confirmed UIA’s
intervention. Heller denied, however, that the bankers supported pesification. 237 Speaking about a key meeting at the Palacio de Hacienda
(Palace of the Treasury), Heller said: “This is not true. I was in that
meeting and argued with Jorge Todesca, second in hierarchy to Remes
Lenicov, and the people from UIA, who encouraged the decision to
pesify.” He added:
I publicly promoted the proposal of creating a trust with what could
be cashed from the main 1,200 major debtors of the system, who
concentrated 50% of credits. These loans should not have been
pesified and so creditors could have been guaranteed restitution in
the original currency up to the amount cashed. But they told me that
this was not possible and that debts would be pesified. There was a
238
political decision to liquefy debts.

In contrast, bankruptcy-like legislation should ideally be discussed
and decided before the crisis hits and when there is uncertainty about
how different details in the proposal will benefit or harm various interest
“liberalization” reforms in the 1990s); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of
Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998).
234. Mendiguren resigned in April 2002 and is now one of UIA’s Vice Presidents.
235. Julio Nudler, Cuando Remes desembucha, PAGINA/12, Aug. 17, 2002,
available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/imprimir/diario/economia/2-9007-2002-0817.html.
236. Id.
237. However, some commentators persuasively note that banks agreed to
asymmetric pesification because they were assured sufficient compensation through
Government’s bonds. See, e.g., Rodríguez Diez, supra note 225, at 111.
238. Remes Lenicov declaró que cuando propuso pesificar los bancos dijeron que sí,
LA NACIÓN, Aug. 18, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota
_id=423350.
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groups. This uncertainty reduces the expected value of all rent seeking
investments, even those made by highly concentrated groups.
Second, emergency measures treat all banks and financial entities
alike, irrespective of their liabilities and assets. This causes a serious
moral hazard problem in the banking system. On the one hand, depositors anticipating that emergency measures will give them equal odds of
recovery in the face of a crisis will not rationally invest resources in
obtaining information regarding an entity’s financial solidity. On the
other hand (and related to consumers’ behavior), banks will not rationally invest in maintaining liquid assets. The latter effect is dramatic in
exchange regimes that lack a lender of last resort (hard pegs and formal
dollarization). If the banking system is subject to periodic emergencies,
there is little chance to develop a sizable local market of capital sources,
which means that social welfare and GDP growth will be lower than
they could be otherwise.
Finally, emergency powers represent an anomaly within the liberal
system of political power. It is true that emergency powers have been
often recognized in both the United States and Argentina in great national emergencies. 239 In the last few decades, however, various Argentine
governments have abused emergency powers whose justification rests
on emergencies that usually have strong fiscal components and that
therefore, are under government control. 240 More fundamentally,
Negretto and Aguilar Rivera claim that “liberalism – the political theory
that informed Spanish American constitution makers – traditionally
lacked an adequate theoretical framework to address the problem of
emergencies in political life.” 241 Typically, “regulatory emergencies”
lead to “functional emergencies”; these, in turn, lead to a permanent
alteration of the separation of powers. Because emergencies tend to alter
the separation of powers by delegating congressional powers in the
executive branch, the real upshot of the theory of emergency is to increase the President’s power at the expense of the legislative and judicial
branches. A good example is Peralta, which recognized the President’s
power to enact legislative orders under a state of emergency. 242 Three
239.
240.
241.

Banks & Carrió, supra note 58.
Mairal, supra note 10.
Gabriel L. Negretto & José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency
Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional
Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797-98 (2000).
242. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/1990, “Peralta, Luis
Arcenio v. Nación Argentina / acción de amparo,” Fallos (1990-313-513) (Arg.).
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years later, the Constitutional Reform of 1994 introduced decrees of
necessity and urgency, thus permanently altering the system of checks
and balances originally established in the Argentine constitution.
X. CONCLUSION
The restructuring of financial property after macro-economic
debacles has often proceeded in accordance with four different paradigms: the emergency paradigm, the monetary paradigm, the valorist
paradigm, and the social justice paradigm. The emergency paradigm has
been the prevailing paradigm to resolve legal controversies arising from
bank runs and economic crises. The monetary paradigm has traditionally been used to ground legal tender legislation, which establishes the
inconvertibility of the national currency and economic liquefaction of
public debts denominated in the national currency. The valorist paradigm has also been used for redistributing gains and burdens in macroeconomic debacles (i.e., hyperinflations). All these paradigms show
important doctrinal differences. The emergency paradigm can serve to
modify the time dimension of obligations (i.e., maturity), but not their
nature (i.e., their currency denomination, or nominal quantity). The
valorist paradigm can serve to modify the nominal amount of obligations, but not their time dimension. The monetary paradigm can ground
a modification of the currency denomination of contracts (and the value
thereof) when contracts are denominated in the national currency
(internal denomination), but not when contracts are denominated in a
foreign currency (external denomination). Therefore, this paradigm
cannot be applied to countries that have formal or de facto dollarization. 243 The social justice paradigm is unnecessarily costly in terms of
prosperity and welfare, because it can destroy the incentive structure of
the banking system; egalitarian wealth redistribution can be less costly
achieved through taxation and the recognition of a basic income
entitlement.
Finally, the bankruptcy paradigm suggested in this Article can
include a variety of restructuring measures. Three examples have been
mentioned in this paper: a “double pole circuit breaker,” a scheme of
freely negotiable bank notes issued by solvent entities, and the creation

243. This was the case of Argentina in 2001. However, this paradigm could be
applied in countries that require financial contracts to be denominated in the national
currency (e.g., Brazil).
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of a mutual fund encompassing the assets and liabilities of insolvent
banks. 244 None of these strategies require utilizing the emergency, the
monetary, the valorist, or the social justice paradigms. Moreover, there
are political economic reasons that favor the bankruptcy paradigm as
compared with the emergency paradigm. Political and economic factors
predict that the emergency paradigm will systematically be wielded to
legitimize exploitation of large, unorganized groups. The emergency
paradigm also creates constitutional threats for the separation of powers,
as well as moral hazard problems in bank operations.

244.

Peralta, Luis Arcenio, Fallos (1990-313-513); see supra Part IX.

